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ABSTRACT
This article, which is the first comprehensive discussion of the 
American legal concept of home, makes two major contributions.  First, the 
article systematically examines how homes are treated more favorably than 
other types of property in a wide range of legal contexts, including criminal
law and procedure, torts, privacy, landlord-tenant, debtor-creditor, family 
law, and income taxation.  Second, the article considers the normative issue 
of whether this favorable treatment is justified.  The article draws from 
material on the psychological concept of home and the cultural history of 
home throughout this analysis, providing insight into the interests at stake in 
various legal issues involving the home.
The article concludes that homes are different from other types of 
property and give rise to legal interests deserving of special legal protection, 
but that these interests can be outweighed by competing interests in 
particular legal contexts.  The result is that in many contexts special legal 
treatment of homes is justified.  In other contexts, for example residential 
rent control, the strength of competing interests means that the law 
overprotects the home.  In still other contexts, for example eminent domain 
law as embodied by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kelo v. New 
London, the law tends to underprotect the home.
INTRODUCTION
“Home” is a powerful and rich word in the English language.  As our 
cultural cliché “a house is not a home” suggests, “home” means far more 
than a physical structure.  “Home” evokes thoughts of, among many other 
things, family, safety, privacy, and community.  In the United States, home 
and home ownership are held in high cultural esteem, as American as apple 
pie and baseball.  With our society’s evolution beyond its agrarian origins, 
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the home has replaced land as the dominant form of American property.1
As a result, we have developed something of an ideology of home, where 
the protection of home and all it stands for is an American virtue.2
This Article is about the legal concept of home and how homes often are 
treated more favorably by the law than other types of property.  Houses are 
explicitly protected by the Third and Fourth Amendments to the 
Constitution,3 and homes are given more protection than other types of 
property, such as cars, in search and seizure law.4  The federal tax code 
strongly favors homeownership over home rental and ownership of other 
types of property.5 Post-foreclosure rights of redemption and just cause 
eviction statutes protect the possession of a home in debtor-creditor law and 
landlord-tenant law.6 Other examples abound.
On a general level, special legal treatment of homes is neither surprising 
nor controversial.  Homes are different in meaningful ways from other types 
of property, and their unique nature in many circumstances justifies a 
favored legal status.  This Article, however, seeks to move beyond the 
intuitive and cultural-ideological sense that homes are unique, and to 
examine in more detail whether and why homes are deserving of favored 
treatment in different legal contexts.
To do so, this Article breaks the legal concept of home into component 
parts, organizing legal issues involving the home into two general 
categories:  those relating to safety, freedom and privacy, and those relating 
to possession.  To gain insight into the interests involved in various legal 
contexts, this Article also draws throughout its analysis on materials from 
the cultural history of home and the psychology of home.7 Ideas of home, 
privacy and family as currently understood evolved together in the late 
Middle Ages, and this cultural history is relevant to issues in privacy law 
and family law.  Similarly, ideas like privacy, security, family and 
1 See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, at 4 (2001) (noting that for most Americans 
their home is their most valuable asset).
2 See, e.g., Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 IOWA L. REV. 277, 326-27 (1998) (discussing the 
American ideology of home); CONSTANCE PERIN, EVERYTHING IN ITS PLACE, 72 (1977) (quoting Calvin 
Coolidge:  “No greater contribution could be made to the stability of the Nation, and the advancement of its
ideals, than to make it a Nation of homeowning families.”).
3 U.S. CONST. amend. III (“No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent 
of the Owner . . . .”); U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”).
4 See infra Part I.B.
5 See infra notes 162 - 165 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 98 - 104 and accompanying text.  
7 The literature on the psychology of home is dominated by theoretical essays, and there are relatively few 
empirical studies that have looked into the psychological relationship of actual people to their actual homes.  See
Sandy G. Smith, The Essential Qualities of A Home, 14 J. ENVTL. PSYCH. 31, 31 (1994) (providing both review of 
the theoretical literature and the results of an empirical study); J. Tognoli, Residential Environments, in
HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 655 (D. Stokois & I Altman eds., 1987).  By-and-large, however, 
the theory and empirical evidence are consistent, and it is possible to identify broad themes about how people 
relate to their homes on a psychological level.  These themes are incorporated into the discussion that follows.
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continuity are deeply rooted in the psychology of home (which reflects and 
reinforces the values inherent in the contemporary cultural idea of the 
home), and unsurprisingly are reflected in many of the unique legal 
protections given to the home.
Following the structure outlined above, Part I examines home as a 
source of security, liberty and privacy.  These interests, encapsulated in the 
common-law maxim “A man’s home is his castle,” are implicated in a 
group of related areas of law where homes clearly are favored over other 
types of property.  For example, in tort law and criminal law, acts of self-
help in the defense of a home are expressly privileged in most jurisdictions.  
Homes also are given favored treatment in search and seizure law, and the 
importance of the sanctity of the home to the Founders is reflected in the 
language of the Fourth Amendment.  The idea of home is tied intimately to 
cultural ideas of privacy, and unsurprisingly homes are given favored 
treatment in privacy law.  In all of these areas, the protection given to 
homes has limits – the government, for example, may intrude into the 
private sphere of the home in a number of contexts if it has a strong reason 
to do so.  Notwithstanding those limits, the pervasiveness of the special 
treatment of homes in these contexts suggests the existence of a strong 
cultural consensus that homes are uniquely important when issues of safety, 
autonomy and privacy are at stake.
Part II discusses the personal connection between individuals and their 
homes in the context of legal issues involving the possession of homes.  It 
begins with an analysis of the strength of the personal possessory interest in 
a home – that is, the interest of a person in staying in possession of a 
particular home in a particular place.  This analysis uses as a starting point 
Margaret Jane Radin’s personhood theory, which argues that the possession 
of homes should be favored against competing interests on the basis of an
intuitive view that people become personally connected to their homes.  
Looking in part to the psychology of home, this analysis suggests that while 
the personal possessory interest in the home is real and deserving of legal 
protection, it is not as strong as Radin’s intuitive view would suggest.
Part II then examines a series of legal issues involving the possession of 
a home, weighing in each circumstance the relative strength of the 
possessory interest in the home against competing interests.  Some areas of 
landlord-tenant law (for example, just cause eviction statutes) and debtor-
creditor law (for example, post-foreclosure rights of redemption) strike an 
appropriate balance between the possessory interest in the home and
competing interests. Other areas of law, particularly residential rent control
and certain homestead exemptions, tilt the scale too far in favor of the 
resident’s interest in possession.  Still other areas of law, notably eminent 
domain law and the post-divorce property distribution rules applicable in 
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some jurisdictions, underprotect the personal interest in the home.
Part III focuses on the normative issue of whether homes that do not fit 
the archetypal single-family owner-occupied suburban home should be 
treated differently by the law than homes that do fit the archetype.  The 
obvious answer in most circumstances is “no,” and “home” as used in this 
Article unless otherwise qualified includes any type of permanent dwelling, 
whether rented or owned, and whether occupied by one person or by a 
family or group of any sort.  In some circumstances, however, a justifiable 
distinction may be made between owned and rented homes.  For example, 
disparate treatment makes sense in legal issues that concern the inherent 
difference between freehold estates and tenancies.  In some other 
circumstances, policies favoring ownership – such as the treatment of 
mortgage interest and capital gains on homes by the Internal Revenue Code 
– may be justified on the republican ground that homeowners are more 
involved citizens than home renters.  The mere existence of these 
justifications, however, does not mean that favoritism of ownership is 
warranted in a particular circumstance.  Disparate tax treatment of owned 
and rented homes can have negative consequences that may outweigh the 
benefits of encouraging ownership.
The overarching conclusion of this Article is that while homes are 
different from other types of property, the unique nature of the home 
justifies additional legal protection in some, but not all, circumstances.  The 
result for any particular legal issue depends on the relative strength of the 
interests in the home as measured against competing interests.  In many 
areas of the law, such as those involving freedom and privacy, the 
additional legal protection given to homes is justified by their unique 
nature.  In some other areas, however, a close analysis reveals that the law 
overprotects or underprotects the home.  In each case, striking the correct 
balance requires consideration of only the interests in the home relevant to 
the issue at hand, rather than the entirety of a broader intuitive or 
ideological conception of the home.
I. HOME AS CASTLE:  SECURITY, LIBERTY AND PRIVACY
One of the most pervasive clichés in the common law is that a man’s 
home is his castle.  The protection of liberty is a key element generally in 
Western theories of property,8 but the castle doctrine encapsulates the idea 
that homes are different from other types of property when issues of 
personal security, freedom and privacy are at stake.  The pervasiveness of 
the castle doctrine and of the special treatment of homes by the law in these
8 See Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property as Entrance, 91 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW __, __ n.1 (2005) (collecting 
examples of liberal theories of property).
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areas are reflective of a cultural consensus for protecting homes as unique 
zones of individual safety, autonomy and privacy.  Indeed, the modern idea 
of the home developed hand-in-hand with the modern idea of privacy,9 and 
interests in safety, freedom and privacy are strongly reflected in the 
psychology of home.10 The existence of this cultural consensus, however, 
does not mean that interests in safety, freedom and privacy always trump 
competing interests.  This Part explores the role of these interests – and 
their limits – in criminal law, tort law, criminal procedure and privacy law.
A. Security Against Other Individuals
By their physical nature, homes provide their inhabitants with a measure 
of security against attack or invasion by other individuals.  But more 
important to personal security than locks or alarms is the additional 
protection given to homes by the law.  As Charlotte Perkins Gilman 
observed, “Our safety is really insured by social law and order, not by any 
system of home defence.  Against the real dangers of modern life, the 
[physical] home is no safeguard.”11
The legal protection given to the security of homes can be divided into 
two major categories.  First, the law privileges certain acts of self-help 
made in defense of the home that would in another context be criminal or 
tortious.  Second, the law imposes criminal sanctions upon individuals who 
invade a home, and these sanctions are significantly greater than those 
imposed for invasions of other types of property.
The legal doctrine that a man’s home is his castle has its common law 
origins in cases dating back to at least 1505 involving the right to defend a 
home against invasion by other private individuals.12  In Semayne’s Case, 
decided in 1604, the Court held that:
[T]he house of every one is to him as his castle and fortress, as well for his 
defence against injury and violence, as for his repose; and although the life of a 
9 See infra notes 50 - 61 and accompanying text.
10 The physical structure of a home provides shelter and physical safety. Smith, supra note 7, at 33-34; Karin 
Zingmark & Astrid Norberg, The Experience of Being at Home Throughout the Life Span; Investigation of 
Persons Aged From 2 to 102, 41 INT’L J. AGING & HUM. DEV. 47, 50 (1995). The physical space of the home 
also is a source of privacy, and of related feelings of comfort and freedom. Smith, supra note 7, at 32 (“[The] 
feeling of control within the home is salient for most people, and is linked to the to the satisfaction of basic 
psychological needs.”); Zingmark & Norberg, supra, at 50. An empirical study of American attitudes towards 
privacy reported that invasions of homes generally, and bedrooms in particular, were widely perceived as very 
significant invasions of privacy. See Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of 
Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases:  An Empirical Look at “Understandings Recognized By 
Society”, 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 738-39 (1993).
11 CHARLOTTE PERKINS GILMAN, THE HOME, ITS WORK AND INFLUENCE 32 (1903).
12
 William J. Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment:  Origins and Original Meaning 602-1791, xciv (1990) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School).  Similar doctrines recognizing the special status of 
the home existed in a number of ancient legal traditions. See id. at xcii-xciv; NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY 
AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 14-15 (1937).  For 
example, the Code of Hammurabi permitted the killing of housebreakers, as did Anglo-Saxon and Norman law. 
See Lasson, supra, at 14-19.
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man is a thing precious and favoured in law; . . . if thieves come to a man’s house 
to rob him, or murder, and the owner or his servants kill any of the thieves in 
defence of himself and his house, it is not felony, and he shall lose nothing.13
The privilege of defense of the home continues to the present, and the 
castle doctrine has played a significant part in the rule, applicable in many 
states, that a person need not retreat when attacked in the home.14 Judge 
Cardozo explained the reasons for the exception, using language 
highlighting the unique nature of the home, in New York v. Tomlins:
It is not now, and never been the law that a man assailed in his own dwelling, is 
bound to retreat.  If assailed there, he may stand his ground, and resist the attack.  
He is under no duty to take to the fields and the highways, a fugitive from his own 
home. . . . Flight is for sanctuary and shelter, and shelter, if not sanctuary, is in the 
home.15
13 Semayne's Case, 5 Coke Rep. 91a, 91b, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B. 1604).
14 See PROSSER ON TORTS § 19 (5th Lawyer’s ed. 1984) (“In [some] states, the ancient rule that there is no 
obligation to retreat when the defendant is attacked in his own dwelling house, ‘his castle’ has been continued.  
This rule is apparently based on ‘an instinctive feeling that a home is sacred, and that it is improper to require a 
man to submit to pursuit from room to room in his own house.’”).
15
 New York v. Tomlins, 213 N.Y. 240, 243 (1914).  Another eloquent statement of this rule, made in an 
advocacy context, comes from Clarence Darrow’s closing argument in People v. Henry Sweet, where Darrow was 
defending a black man against murder charges arising from the defense of his home against a white mob:
The first instinct a man has is to save his life. He doesn’t need to experiment. He hasn’t 
time to experiment. When he thinks it is time to save his life, he has the right to act. There 
isn’t any question about it. It has been the law of every English speaking country so long as 
we have had law. Every man’s home is his castle, which even the King may not enter. 
Every man has a right to kill to defend himself or his family, or others, either in the defense 
of the home or in the defense of themselves.
Closing argument of Clarence Darrow in the case of People v. Henry Sweet, at
http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/sweet/darrowsummation.html (last vistited Mar. 2, 2005).
Cardozo’s opinion in Tomlins contains a short survey of authority holding that there is no duty to retreat in 
the home. Tomlins, 213 N.Y. at 243-44.  Although Cardozo held that the rule was the same when the attacker  also 
is an occupant of the home, id. at 244, the analysis of the duty to retreat can be more complicated in intra-
domestic disputes because the attacker has the legal right to be in the home. See generally Weiland v. State, 732 
So.2d 1044, 1055 nn. 8-9 (Fla. 1999) (providing broad survey of the law in various jurisdictions in the United 
States on this issue); Linda A. Sharp, annotation Homicide:  Duty to Retreat Where Assailant and Assailed Share 
the Same Living Quarters, 67 A.L.R. 5th 637 (1999); Melissa Wheatcroft, Duty to Retreat for Cohabitants—In 
New Jersey A Battered Spouse’s Home is Not Her Castle, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 539 (1999); see also State v. Gartland, 
694 A.2d 564, 569-71 (N.J. 1997); Beth Bjerregaard & Anita N. Blowers, Chartering a New Frontier for Self-
Defense Claims:  The Applicability of the Battered Person Syndrome as a Defense for Parricide Offenders, 33 U. 
LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 843, 870-71 (1995).  The duty to retreat has been particularly controversial in cases 
involving victims of domestic violence who kill their batterers.  The majority of jurisdictions have held that there 
is no duty to retreat in the home in these cases, in part because a person in her own home has no further place to 
which to flee. See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 673 N.E.2d 1339, 1343 (Ohio 1997); Commonwealth v. Derby, 678 
A.2d 784, 784-87 (Pa. Super. 1996); People v. Emmick, 525 N.Y.S.2d 77, 78 (4th Dep’t 1988); People v. 
Lenkevich, 229 N.W.2d 298 (Mich. 1975); MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(ii)(A).  The contrary view is that a 
person should have to retreat in the home in cases of attack by a cohabitant if retreat can be accomplished safely. 
See, e.g., Thomas, 673 N.E.2d at 1347 (Pfeiffer & Cook, J.J., dissenting); State v. Gartland, 694 A.2d 564, 571 
(N.J. 1997); State v. Quarles, 504 A.2d 473, 476 (R.I. 1986); State v. Pontery, 117 A.2d 473, 475 (N.J. 1955); see 
also Wheatcroft, supra, at 551 & n.52 (discussing jurisdictions following the minority view).  In domestic abuse 
cases, however, the history of violence makes it at best doubtful that safe retreat is possible. See Thomas, 673 
N.E.2d at 1343; Maryanne E. Kampmann, The Legal Victimization of Battered Women, 15 WOMEN’S RTS. L. 
REP. 101, 112-13 (1993); see also Gartland, 694 A.2d at 571 (criticizing statute that required a holding of duty to 
retreat inside the home, and arguing that statute should be changed in part because retreat is unrealistic and unfair 
in cases involving history of abuse).  That said, the statement made by the Thomas majority that “There is no 
rational reason to make . . . a distinction . . . between cases in which the assailant has a right equal to the 
defendant’s to inhabit the residents and cases in which the assailant is an intruder,” 673 N.E.2d at 1343, goes too 
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The importance of homes to personal security also is reflected in the 
penalties imposed in criminal law as punishment for invasion of a home, 
which generally exceed the penalties imposed for invasions of other types 
of property.  The additional protection given homes in criminal law has a
long history in the common law – indeed, at common law, the crime of 
burglary was concerned exclusively with invasions of homes16 – and is 
widely reflected in contemporary criminal statutes.17
B. Security Against the Government and the Fourth Amendment
The castle doctrine is a frequent feature in contemporary cases involving 
governmental searches of a home.  It is somewhat ironic, therefore, to note 
that at the time of the origins of the castle doctrine, the home was expressly 
held not to be impervious to invasions by the government, which was 
viewed as having virtually “absolute powers of search, arrest, and 
confiscation.”18  In Semayne’s Case, discussed above,19 the court began by 
stating the castle doctrine privileging the killing of thieves invading a home, 
but then immediately went on to state that “In all cases where the King is 
party, the sheriff (if the doors be not open) may break the house, either to 
arrest or do other execution of the King’s process.”20
Gradually, however, the castle doctrine began to be used as a rhetorical 
tool by those resisting government invasions of the home.  In 1663, three 
Rhode Islanders informed a constable attempting to serve a warrant “that 
‘they . . . were Resoulffed to knock Down any man that should pry in upon 
far.  There is an obvious reason to make such a distinction – the cohabitant has an equal right to be in the home.  
A more accurate statement would have been that there are reasons to make that distinction, but, particularly in 
cases involving a history of abuse, these reasons do not outweigh the victim’s right to defend against an attacker 
without retreat in the home.
16 See CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 325 at 251 (15th ed. 1995) (noting that only 
invasions of homes were the subject of common-law burglary); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 21.1(c) at 
1022 (4th ed. 2003) (same); see also Thomas Y. Davies, Rediscovering The Original Fourth Amendment, 98 
MICH. L. REV. 547, 642 n.259 (1999) ( “The common-law felony of burglary also demonstrated the unique status 
of the house.  As a general rule, attempt offenses (conduct committed "with intent" to inflict a harm) were only 
misdemeanors at common law; however, breaking into a house at night with intent to commit a felony was a 
felony.”).  Similar protection of the home was reflected in Anglo-Saxon law, which “recognized the crime of 
hamsocn (or hamfare), an offense the whole gist of which was solely the forcible entry into a man’s dwelling, a 
‘domus invasion.’  Throughout the laws of Anglo-Saxon and Norman times this offense was looked upon with 
great severity, justifying the killing of the perpetrator in the act without the payment of compensation usual in 
those days.” LASSON, supra note 12, at 18 -19.  Similarly, the common-law crime of arson focused on homes, as 
opposed to other types of structures. See TORCIA, supra, § 339 at 333; LAFAVE, supra, § 21.3(c).  
17 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 22.1(2) (providing that invasion of a home is subject to higher level of 
punishment than other types of burglary); CAL. PENAL CODE § 460 (West 1999) (same); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 
140.20, 140.25 (McKinney 2004) (same); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-11-311, 16-11-312, 16- 11- 313 (same); LAFAVE, 
supra note 16, § 21.1(g) at 1026 (noting that the fact that a  home is involved is a common aggravating factor in 
modern burglary statutes).
18
 Cuddihy, supra note 12, at xcix (discussing Semayne’s Case, 5 Coke Rep. 91a, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B. 
1604)).
19 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
20 Semayne's Case, 5 Coke Rep. 91a, 91b, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B. 1604).
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them for their howse was ther Castle.’”21 By the Revolutionary War era a 
century later, the castle doctrine was often used in rhetoric against abuses of 
government power.22  Two prominent and influential examples of this usage 
stand out.  According to John Adams’ notes of James Otis’ argument in the 
1761 Writs of Assistance Case, Otis argued that the writ at issue was 
“against the fundamental Principles of Law” because “A Man, who is quiet, 
is as secure in his House, as a Prince in his Castle, not with standing all his 
Debts, and civil Process of any kind.”23  Two years later, in a speech to
Parliament, William Pitt used the castle doctrine to make a powerful 
rhetorical statement for the primacy of even the most humble individual at 
home against the power of the King:
The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the crown.  It 
may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may 
enter; the rain may enter; but the King of England cannot enter – all his force 
dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement!24
As a result of this type of rhetoric, the castle doctrine radically changed 
meaning over the course of less than two centuries, as “‘A man’s house is 
his castle (except against the government)’ yielded to ‘A man’s house is his 
castle (especially against the government).’”25
In this new form, the castle doctrine was an important intellectual 
foundation of the Fourth Amendment,26 and more generally the sanctity and 
21
 Cuddihy, supra note 12, at xcvii (quoting Rhode Island court record dated May 16, 1663).
22 Id. at xcvii; see also Davies, supra note 16, at 642-50 (1999); LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL MEANING 
AND THE FRAMERS’ CONSTITUTION, 234-35 (1988). 
23 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 125-26 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965).  As Leonard 
Levy has noted,
Any fastidious legal historian must acknowledge that Otis’s argument compounded 
mistakes and misinterpretations.  In effect, he reconstructed the fragmentary evidence 
buttressing the rhetorical tradition against general searches, and he advocated that any 
warrant other than a specific one violated the British constitution.  That Otis distorted 
history is pedantic; he was making history.
LEVY, supra note 22, at 227. Adams himself used the castle doctrine in arguments he made as a legal advocate: 
An Englishmans dwelling House is his Castle.  The Law has erected a Fortification round 
it–and as every Man is Party to the Law, i.e. the Law is a Covenant of every Member of 
society with every other Member, therefore every Member of Society has entered into a 
solemn Covenant with every other that he shall enjoy in his own dwelling House as 
compleat a security, safety and Peace and Tranquility as if it was surrounded with Walls of 
Brass, with Ramparts and Palisadoes and defended with a Garrison and Artillery.... 
Every English[man] values himself exceedingly, he takes a Pride and he glories justly in 
that strong Protection, that sweet Security, that delightfull Tranquillity which the Laws have 
thus secured to him in his own House, especially in the Night.  Now to deprive a Man of 
this Protection, this quiet and Security in the dead of Night, when himself and Family 
confiding in it are asleep, is treat[ing] him not like an Englishman not like a Freeman but 
like a Slave.... 
1 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS at 137 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965) (quoting Adams’s notes 
of his argument in the 1774 case King v. Stewart).
24
 William Pitt, SPEECH ON THE EXCISE BILL (1763).
25
 Cuddihy, supra note 12, at c (emphasis original).
26 See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914); Davies, supra note 16, at 642 -50; Levy, supra note 
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special nature of the home were issues of critical importance to the 
founders.  As Thomas Y. Davies has written, the “historical record . . . 
reveals that the Framers focused their concerns and complaints [about 
government searches and seizures] rather precisely on searches of houses 
under general warrants,”27 and reference to the importance of home was 
common in Revolutionary-era rhetoric attacking excessive government 
searches.28 The unique nature and importance of homes is reinforced by the 
fact that Revolutionary-era critics tended not to object as strongly when 
other types of property – such as warehouses and ships – were subject to 
oppressive searches by British authorities.29  Homes were also treated 
differently than other types of property in colonial-era search and seizure 
statutes30 and in early federal statutes.31   Express protection of homes was 
22, at 222; Cuddihy, supra note 12, at xc-c; see also Jonathan L. Hafetz, “A Man’s Home Is His Castle?:  
Reflections on the Home, the Family, and Privacy During the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, 8 
WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 175, 175 (2002) (discussing relationship of castle doctrine to Fourth Amendment); 
THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE 
POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 365 (1868) (stating that the common law maxim that “every 
man’s house is his castle,” which “secures to the citizen immunity in his home against the prying eyes of the 
government,” has been incorporated into the Fourth Amendment). 
27
 Davies, supra note 16, at 601.
28 Id. at 601-03.  Press accounts of the Wilkesite trials in England, which squarely presented the issue of 
government power to search a home, were widely disseminated in the Colonies, and often featured references to 
the sanctity of the home.  See id. at 564, 602.  James Otis’ arguments against the general warrant, quoted above, 
focus on the home, see supra note 23 and accompanying text, as did a report of a Boston town meeting usually 
attributed to Samuel Adams, see Davies, supra note 16, at 603 n.139 :
[O]ur homes and even our bedchambers, are exposed to be ransacked, our boxes, chests & 
trunks broke open ravaged and plundered by wretches, whom no prudent man would 
venture to employ even as menial servants; whenever they are pleased to say they suspect 
there are in the house wares etc. for which the dutys have not been paid.  Flagrant instances 
of wanton exercise of this power, have frequently happened in this and other sea port 
Towns.  By this we are cut off from that domestick security which renders the lives of the 
most unhappy in some measure agreeable.  Those Officers may under colour of law and the 
cloak of a general warrant, break thro’ the sacred rights of the Domicil, ransack mens 
houses, destroy their securities, carry off their property, and with little danger to themselves 
commit the most horred murders.
TRACTS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: 1763-1776, 243- 44 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1967).
Adams’ reference to “wretches, whom no prudent man would venture to employ even as menial servants” is 
an example of a class issue that contributed to the outrage over general warrants.  As Davies explains:
[T]he Framers’ perception of the untrustworthiness of the ordinary officer was reinforced 
by class-consciousness and status concerns.  It was disagreeable enough for an elite or 
middle-class householder to have to open his house to a search in response to a command 
from a high status magistrate acting under a judicial commission; it was a gross insult to the 
householder’s status as a ‘free man’ to be bossed about by an ordinary officer who was 
likely drawn from an inferior class.   For example, during the 1761 Writs of Assistance 
Case, James Otis complained that the delegation of authority to a petty officer by a general 
writ of assistance reduced a householder to being “the servant of servants.”
Davies, supra note 16, at 577 -78.
29 See id. at 602-08.  For example, in one newspaper article, James Otis repeatedly complained of violations 
of homes but “did not complain of searches of ships, shops, or warehouses.” Id. at 602 n.136.  Ships were 
generally understood to be treated differently than other types of property because they fell under admiralty law, 
and therefore were understood by the framers not to fall under the purview of the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 
605-08.  Contemporary misunderstanding of the Colonial-era legal status of ships has contributed to an 
unwarranted erosion of the protection given homes in civil forfeiture cases. See id. at 607 & n.156.
30 See Davies, supra note 16, at 681 -82.  
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provided in many of the colonial precursors to the Fourth Amendment.32
Consistent with this historical record, search and seizure law continues 
to emphasize the unique nature of homes and to give homes additional 
protection as compared to other types of property.33 Prohibition-era cases 
gave special treatment to homes.34  Contemporary Fourth Amendment cases 
contain frequent references to the castle doctrine35 and the sanctity of 
home.36 The Supreme Court has held that a search of a home generally 
speaking can only be made with a warrant,37 stating that “the Fourth 
Amendment draws ‘a firm line at the entrance to the house,”38 and making 
“clear that any physical invasion of the structure of the home, ‘by even a 
fraction of an inch,’ was too much.”39 Searches of other types of property, 
such as cars and open land, often may be made without warrants.40
31 See id. at 713-14.  
32 See id. at 595-97.
33
 The additional protection given to homes is also supported by the empirical evidence on American social 
values. See Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 10, at 738 -39 (collecting empirical evidence that searches of 
homes, and particularly bedrooms, are considered highly invasive in American society).
34
 As Jonathan L. Hafetz has explained,
Federal Prohibition law treated the home with particular deference.  The Volstead Act, 
which implemented Prohibition, not only barred issuance of a warrant to search ‘any private 
dwelling occupied as such unless it is being used for the unlawful sale of intoxicating 
liquor,’ but also provided for criminal sanctions against any officer who conducted such an 
unlawful search.  Many cases invalidating liquor seizures involved ‘private dwellings,’ 
defined by statute to include rooms ‘occupied not transiently but solely as a residence.’  
Even when courts initially upheld Prohibition searches and seizures against legal 
challenges, they reaffirmed the sanctity of the home and distinguished searches for illegal 
liquors in private homes, from those in open fields and automobiles.  The majority of state 
courts that adopted a rule excluding unconstitutionally seized evidence – a rule required 
under the Constitution only in federal cases at the time – did so in Prohibition cases 
involving searches of private homes (or businesses).
Hafetz, supra note 26, at 200 -01.
35 See, e.g., Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 94 (1998); Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931 (1995).
36 See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 610 (1999) (“The Fourth Amendment embodies this centuries-
old principle of respect for the privacy of the home.”); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (an “overriding 
respect for the sanctity of the home . . . has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.”); 
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976) (“[T]he sanctity of private dwellings [is] often 
afforded the most stringent Fourth Amendment protection.”); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 
(1961) (“At the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and 
there be free from unreasonable government searches.”).
37 See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (“With few exceptions, the question whether a 
warrantless search of a home is reasonable and hence constitutional must be answered no.”); Payton v. New York, 
445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) (“[A] basic principle of Fourth Amendment law [is that] searches and seizures inside a 
home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.” (quotation omitted)); United States v. United States 
Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 316 (1972) (“[P]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of 
the Fourth Amendment is directed....”); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914) (holding that searches 
of homes require warrants).
38 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40 (quoting Payton, 445 U.S. at 590).
39 Id., at 37 (quoting Silverman, 365 U.S. at 512).
40 See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938 (1996); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 569-72 
(1991); United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1997); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984); United States 
v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 804-809 (1982).  Drawing a line between homes and vehicles can be challenging in cases 
involving hybrids such as motor homes and houseboats.  Courts faced with this challenge have used a functional 
test to decide whether the hybrid qualifies as a home or vehicle. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 393-94 & 
n.3 (1985) (categorizing motor home as a vehicle but leaving open possibility of a different result if motor home 
was “situated in a way or place that objectively indicates that it is being used as a residence”; relevant factors 
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Similarly, a warrant is required for arrests made in the home,41 but not for 
arrests made on the street or in other locations.42
In Kyllo v. United States, the Court held that a thermal imaging scan of 
a home was an illegal search, rejecting the government’s argument that the 
scan did not reveal “intimate details” and noting that “In the home, our 
cases show, all details are intimate details, because the entire area is held 
safe from prying government eyes.”43 In contrast, an aerial photograph of 
an industrial complex was not an unconstitutional search, because the 
photograph “did not reveal any ‘intimate details’” and because the industrial 
complex did not “share the Fourth Amendment sanctity of the home.”44
Placing a tracing device on a container of chemicals was held in one case 
not to be a search requiring a warrant,45 but monitoring a similar device 
within a home was a search and required a warrant.46
C. Privacy
The importance of home in creating a zone where the individual is 
paramount over the community is a dominant theme in privacy law.  The 
relationship between home and privacy makes a great deal of intuitive sense 
– homes are the primary source of what colloquially is known as personal 
space and are the location of bedrooms, along with everything that 
“bedroom” has become code for in cultural and legal discourse.
include “location, whether the vehicle is readily mobile or instead, for instance, elevated on blocks, whether the 
vehicle is licensed, whether it is connected to utilities, and whether it has convenient access to a public road.”); 
United States v. Albers, 136 F.3d 670, 673 & n.3 (1997) (Kozinski, J.) (applying Carney test and categorizing a 
houseboat as a vehicle, but noting that “in many situations it will be objectively apparent that a houseboat is being 
used as home and not a vehicle.  [For example, a] houseboat not independently mobile or one that is permanently 
moored would present a different case.”); United States v. Hill, 855 F.2d 664, 668 (10th Cir. 1988) (categorizing a 
houseboat as a vehicle under Carney test).    
It may be tempting to advocates, courts and commentators to argue for the extension of the level of 
protection given to homes to other contexts in search and seizure law. Broadening the scope of Fourth 
Amendment protection may generally be intended to increase the protection given to individual liberty in the 
search-and-seizure arena, but may have an unintended contrary effect by devaluing the idea that homes are unique 
and deserve a special level of protection. See Davies, supra note 16, at 739 & n.551 (arguing that broadening the 
scope of Fourth Amendment protection in other contexts has had the effect of undermining the Fourth 
Amendment protection of the home.).  Express analogies of the home to another context can be particularly 
damaging in this regard.  For example, in one case the Supreme Court expressly analogized commercial property 
to a home in a search and seizure case. See See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967) (a “businessman, like 
the occupant of a residence, has a constitutional right to go about his business free from unreasonable official 
entries upon his private commercial property.” (emphasis added)).  The Court’s analogy was intended to bolster 
its extension of Fourth Amendment protection to the business context, but it cheapened the unique status of the 
home by suggesting that it is comparable to commercial property.  Arguments about Fourth Amendment issues in 
other contexts that ignore the unique nature of homes risk devaluing the sanctity of the home that is at the core of 
the Fourth Amendment.
41 See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576 (1980).
42 See, e.g., Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001); 
United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (no warrant requirement for arrest made on street);
43 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37.
44 Id. (distinguishing Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986)).
45 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 267, 281-82 (1983).
46
 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714-15 (1984).
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Unsurprisingly, privacy cases often feature strong rhetoric regarding the 
importance of the home.47 For example, in one case, Justice Black called 
the home “the sacred retreat to which families repair for their privacy and 
their daily way of living,”48 and in another case the Court held that “The 
State’s interest in protecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the 
home is certainly of the highest order in a free and civilized society.”49
This Subpart begins by exploring the simultaneous evolution of the 
modern conceptions of home and privacy, underscoring the interrelationship 
of these ideas in Western culture.  It then illustrates the profound 
importance of home to the legal concept of privacy through two lines of 
cases where otherwise strong social interests are trumped by the privacy 
interest in the home.  The first line of cases involves the right to engage in 
conduct in the home that would be illegal in another context.  The second 
line involves the primacy of privacy in the home over otherwise strongly-
protected First Amendment free speech rights.
1. The Evolution of Home and Privacy
The modern home owes its physical form to the emergence of the 
bourgeois class in the Middle Ages.  As Witold Rybczynski explained, 
“unlike the aristocrat, who lived in a fortified castle, or the cleric, who lived 
in a monastery, or the serf, who lived in a hovel, the bourgeois lived in a 
house.”50
The early bourgeois house, however, was very different from a modern 
home.  Rooms did not have specialized functions, and the same space 
served as working, eating and sleeping quarters throughout the day.51  In the 
absence of public meeting spaces like restaurants, bars and hotels, the house 
served as a place to entertain and to transact business.52  The household 
itself typically went far beyond the immediate family, and often included 
apprentices, servants and friends.53  With large households living in one or 
two rooms, and often sleeping in the same bed, privacy within the 
household did not exist.54
47
 As with search and seizure law, see supra note 40, courts and commentators have used the rhetoric of 
home to advocate for the extension of the privacy protection given to homes to other contexts.  For example, 
Justice Harlan’s famous dissent in Poe v. Ullman used powerful references to the explicit protections of the home 
in the Third and Fourth Amendments, and to the widely acknowledged privacy interest in the home, to advocate 
for broader protection of family life outside of the strict context of the home.  See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 
549 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).  Although it may be an effective advocacy tool for increased privacy 
protection in other contexts, the use of home in this way runs the risk of eroding the privacy protection afforded to 
homes by devaluing the uniqueness of home as a zone where the individual’s right of privacy is paramount.
48
 Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 125 (1969) (Black, J., concurring).
49
 Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980).
50 WITOLD RYBCZYNSKI, HOME:  A SHORT HISTORY OF AN IDEA 25 (1986).
51 Id. at 18.
52 Id. at 27.
53 Id. at 27.
54 Id. at 24, 27-28; see also PHILIPPE ARIES, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD:  A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE 
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The medieval home did not contain a family unit that we would 
recognize, and, as discussed further below in the context of family law, the 
modern conception of family did not emerge until children of the bourgeois 
began to live at home during their school years.55 At the same time as the 
modern family unit began to develop, the home became a less public space 
housing fewer people as many bourgeois began to work outside the home.56
This shift, combined with the presence of children, resulted in a profound 
change in the nature of the home, which “was now a place for personal, 
intimate behavior [and] the setting for a new, compact social unit:  the 
family.”57  A parallel increase in the number of rooms in the home created 
private spaces for people to act as individuals within the family unit.  This 
increase in the number of bedrooms “indicated not only new sleeping 
arrangements, but a novel distinction between the family and the 
individual.”58  By the Eighteenth Century, the desire for privacy became a 
significant component of Western culture.59
Thus, modern conceptions of home, family and privacy evolved 
together.  As historian John Lukacs explained, “Domesticity, privacy, 
comfort, the concept of the home and of the family:  these are, literally, 
principal achievements of the Bourgeois Age.”60  Parents and children 
living together in one dwelling became the core of both our conception of 
home and our conception of family.  The evolution of home in a sense 
separated the family and its private life from the larger community.  
Similarly, the evolution of privacy within the home, and of separate 
bedrooms for the home’s inhabitants, was instrumental in the development 
of a sense of individuality – as home separated family from community, 
bedrooms and growing notions of individual privacy allowed individuals to 
develop separately from both family and the larger community.61
FAMILY, 411 (Robert Baldick trans.1962) (describing lack of privacy in the medieval household).  A lack of 
privacy and intimacy does not mean, of course, that people were not physically intimate.  As Rybczynski notes,
“Medieval paintings frequently show a couple in bed or bath, and nearby in the same room friends or servants in 
untroubled, and apparently unembarrassed, conversation.” RYBCZYNSKI, supra note 50,  at 27-28.  This lack of 
privacy is obviously different from contemporary norms, though it is important to note that legal issues relating to 
privacy typically concern privacy in relation to the government or strangers, as opposed to other members of the 
household.  This distinction notwithstanding, Rybczynski’s description of bathing medieval couples makes an 
interesting comparison to one recent case involving police use of thermal-imaging equipment, in which Justice 
Scalia primly observed that the equipment might reveal “at what hour each night the lady of the house takes her 
daily sauna and bath – a detail that many would consider ‘intimate.’” Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 38 
(2001); see supra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing Kyllo).
55 RYBCZYNSKI, supra note 50, at 48 -49; see infra notes 124 - 128 and accompanying text (discussing 
evolution of the modern concept of family in the context of family law issues involving the home).
56 RYBCZYNSKI, supra note 50, at 39, 77.
57 Id. at 77.
58 Id. at 110.
59 Id. at 86-87; FERNAND BRAUDEL, THE STRUCTURES OF EVERYDAY LIFE:  CIVILIZATION AND 
CAPITALISM, 15TH-18TH CENTURY, at 308 (Miriam Kochan, trans., revised by Sian Reynolds (1981)).
60 John Lukacs, The Bourgeois Interior, 39 AM. SCHOLAR, 616 (1970).
61 RYBCZYNSKI, supra note 50, at 1 11 (“The desire for a room of one’s own was not simply a matter of 
personal privacy.  It demonstrated the growing awareness of individuality – of a growing personal inner life – and 
the need to express this individuality in physical ways.”).
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2. Privacy and Prohibited Conduct in the Home
In Stanley v. Georgia,62 the Supreme Court held that an individual could
not be prosecuted for possession of obscene materials in the home.  In 
reaching this holding, the Court recognized the States’ “broad power to 
regulate obscenity,” but “that power simply does not extend to mere 
possession by the individual in the privacy of his own home.”63  In other 
words, the Court held that conduct that could otherwise be prohibited by the 
States – possession of obscene materials – could not be prohibited in the 
home.64
Other courts following Stanley’s lead have held that certain conduct that 
could be prohibited in other contexts cannot be prohibited in the home. For 
example, the Alaska Supreme Court looked to Stanley in holding that the 
State could not prohibit possession of marijuana in the home, basing its 
holding in part on the reasoning that “If there is any area of human activity 
to which a right to privacy pertains more than any other, it is the home.”65
Similar use of Stanley and the castle doctrine was made by a dissenting 
judge arguing that the government could not prohibit the possession of 
handguns in the home, while recognizing the government’s power to 
regulate handgun possession in other contexts.66
The result in Stanley – that the government cannot prohibit conduct in 
the home that in another context would be subject to criminal sanction – is 
remarkable, both in the positive sense that it highlights the unique nature of 
the home as a source of privacy and in the negative sense that it represents 
an extreme boundary of the castle doctrine. The Stanley Court recognized 
that privacy in the home must have limits, noting that an individual’s 
privacy interest could be trumped by a compelling government interest.67
As an example, it cited a statute prohibiting possession of defense 
information harmful to national security,68 and the Court subsequently held
that the government’s interest in preventing child pornography is 
sufficiently compelling to justify the criminalization of possession of child 
62
 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
63 Id. at 568; see also id. at 565 (“Whatever may be the justifications for other statutes regulating obscenity, 
we do not think they reach into the privacy of one’s own home. If the First Amendment means anything, it means 
that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he 
may watch.”).
64 See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 991-92 (1982) (discussing 
importance of concept of home, and its relation to privacy, autonomy and personhood, to the Court’s analysis in 
Stanley).
65
 Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (1975).
66
 Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (1982) (Coffey, J., dissenting) (“There is no area of 
human activity more protected by the right to privacy than the right to be free from unnecessary government 
intrusion in the confines of the home.”).
67 Stanley, 394 U.S. at 568 n.11.
68 Id.
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pornography in the home.69
Contemporary courts also recognize that the importance of privacy and 
autonomy in the home does not mean that a person should be able to engage 
in conduct within the home that is harmful to others.70 This represents a 
welcome change from the willingness of some courts in the past to use the 
idea of home as a private sphere as an excuse to turn a blind eye to domestic 
abuse.71 Some critics argue that the ideology of privacy in the home 
continues to be used to shelter abuse,72 and the recognition that privacy can 
have a dark side is critical to striking the correct balance between competing 
interests.73  This recognition, however, amounts to a persuasive argument 
that the private sphere of home should have limits, not a persuasive 
argument against the private sphere of the home generally. So limited, the 
role of the home as a unique place of privacy and autonomy remains 
deserving of strong legal protection.
3. Privacy in the Home as a Limit on Free Speech
The unique nature of the home also is reflected in a line of cases holding 
that the interest of privacy in the home trumps free speech rights that 
typically are strongly protected by the courts.  Restrictions on 
demonstrations aimed at a particular residence and on broadcast of political 
speech using sound trucks were upheld on the basis of protecting privacy in 
the home, as was a regulation allowing people to force a vendor to take their 
69 Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 109-10 (1990).
70 See, e.g., Osborne, 495 U.S. at 109 (emphasizing the harm that child pornography inflicts on children  in 
context of upholding law criminalizing possession of child pornography); Ravin, 537 P.2d at 494 (“No one has an 
absolute right to do things in the privacy of his own home which will affect himself or others adversely.”).
71 American courts in the Nineteenth Century declined to punish husbands for spousal abuse, viewing the 
home as a private sphere beyond the scope of public concern. See Hafetz, supra note 26, at 187 -89; see also Reva 
B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”:  Wife Beatings as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2150-74 (1996) 
(discussing Nineteenth-Century courts’ use of privacy as a justification for decriminalizing spousal abuse).
72 See, e.g., Stephen J. Schnably, Property and Pragmatism:  A Critique of Radin’s Theory of Property and 
Personhood, 45 STAN. L. REV. 347, 366 (1993); c.f. Jeanne Moore, Placing Home in Context, 20 J. Envoron. 
Psych. 207, 212 (2000) (In the study of the psychology of home, “there has been an increasing focus on the 
negative and darker side of home experience.  Home can be a prison and a place of terror as well as a haven or 
place of love.”).
73
 As Elizabeth Schneider noted in discussing the feminist critique of privacy, privacy can be both positive 
and negative:
Privacy has seemed to rest on a division of public and private that has been oppressive to 
women and has supported male dominance in the family.  Privacy reinforces the idea that 
the personal is separate from the political; privacy also implies something that should be 
kept secret.  The right of privacy has been viewed as a passive right, one which says that the 
state cannot intervene.  However, . . . Privacy is important to women in many ways.  It 
provides an opportunity for individual self-development, for individual decisionmaking and 
for protection against endless caretaking.  In addition, there are other related aspects of 
privacy, such as the notion of autonomy, equality, liberty, and freedom of bodily integrity, 
that are central to women’s independence and well-being.
Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973, 979 (1991).  Where to draw the line 
between private and public depends on the competing interests involved in each particular case.  
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name off a mailing list.74  In a related case, speech made from the home was 
given additional protection from municipal time, place and manner 
regulation.75  Taken together, these cases reinforce the unique status of the 
home as essential to the liberty of the individual, both as a refuge from 
unwanted speech from other members of the community and as a venue for 
political speech that in form or content is objectionable to the rest of the 
community.
D. A Castle, But Not an Impregnable One
The idea of home as castle is a powerful metaphor and is a major 
component of the ideology of the home.  But the metaphor has its limits, 
and the castle’s walls can be breached by a sufficiently strong competing 
interest.  Despite the strong protection given to the home in the search-and-
seizure context, the government can still enter and search a home if it can 
obtain a warrant.  Similarly, despite the remarkable treatment of home in 
privacy law, where the privacy interest of the home trumps interests that are 
in other contexts treated as paramount by the law, a person should not be 
able to use the zone of privacy and autonomy created by the home to engage 
in conduct harmful to others.  Homes are unique when interests of safety, 
freedom and privacy are at stake, and deserve special legal treatment in 
these contexts.  But the ideological view of home as castle only goes so far, 
and should not be dispositive on any legal issue.
II. HOME, SELF AND POSSESSION
The law generally protects a property owner’s possession of property, 
but recognizes that the right to possession may be overcome by a competing 
74
 Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (residential demonstrations); Rowan v. United States Post Office, 
397 U.S. 728 (1970) (mailing list); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (sound trucks); see also Carey v. 
Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980) (noting importance of residential privacy, but striking down residential 
picketing ordinance because of availability of less restrictive means); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 
(1943) (same); Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 125 (1969) (Black, J., concurring) (discussing importance of 
privacy in the home in the context of political speech).  For a discussion of these cases and the interrelationship 
between the home and First Amendment issues, see Mark Cordes, Property and the First Amendment, 31 U. RICH. 
L. REV. 1, 42-49 (1997).
75 City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 58 (1994).  In Ladue, the Court held that:
A special respect for individual liberty in the home has long been part of our culture and 
our law; that principle has special resonance when the government seeks to constrain a 
person’s ability to speak there.  Most Americans would be understandably dismayed, given 
that tradition, to learn that it was illegal to display from their window an 8-by-11 sign 
expressing their political views.  Whereas the government’s need to mediate among various 
competing uses, including expressive ones, for public streets and facilities is constant and 
unavoidable, its need to regulate temperate speech from the home is surely much less 
pressing.
Id.  Consistent with the holding in Ladue, the psychology of home reveals that the privacy and freedom created by 
the home allows for feelings of self-expression and self-actualization. Smith, supra note 7, at 32.
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interest.  For example, a creditor in many circumstances can overcome an 
owner’s right of possession to satisfy an unpaid debt, and the government 
can take possession of property when required for a public purpose by 
eminent domain so long as just compensation is paid to the owner.
In a number of areas of law, the right to possess a home is given more 
protection the right to possess other types of property.  Homestead 
exemptions, rights of redemption in foreclosure, just cause eviction statutes, 
and residential rent control are just some of the instances where debtor-
creditor laws and landlord-tenant laws give more protection to the 
possessory interest in the home than the law ordinarily gives to the 
possession of other types of property .76
The additional protection given to possession of homes makes intuitive 
sense – no one could imagine being happy about being forced to leave their 
home.  The literature on the psychology of home reinforces this intuitive 
view, showing that homes are sources of feelings of rootedness, continuity, 
stability, permanence, and connection to larger social networks.77  As a 
result, dislocation from a home can have a strong negative psychological 
impact on many people.78  Recognition of the importance of an individual’s 
tie to a home, however, does not mean that the possessory interest in the 
home should be favored by the law in all cases where it is balanced against 
a competing interest that ordinarily is given substantial weight.
This Part examines the legal system’s balance between the possessory 
interest in the home and competing legal interests.79  As a starting point, this 
Part assesses the relative strength of the possessory interest in the home in 
light of Margaret Jane Radin’s analysis of this issue in her groundbreaking 
article Property and Personhood.80  Comparing Radin’s analysis to the 
literature on the psychology of home suggests that the possessory interest in 
the home, while substantial, may not be as strong as Radin asserts.  This 
Part then examines a series of legal issues where the possessory interest in 
the home is balanced against a competing interest, dividing these issues into 
three subgroups:  areas where the law strikes an appropriate balance, areas 
where the law overprotects the possession of a home, and areas where the 
law underprotects possession of a home.
76 See infra notes 98 - 123 and accompanying text.
77 See infra notes 84 - 89 and accompanying text.
78 See infra notes 90 - 94 and accompanying text.
79
 In many circumstances, this issue will become a choice between favoring the competing interest or forcing 
a person to move to another home in another location.  In other circumstances, the choice may not be between two 
homes, one perhaps more desirable than the other, but rather be between a home and homelessness.  The 
discussion here is not focused on a person’s interest in (or perhaps right to) shelter.  Rather, it is focused on the 
right to possess a particular home in a particular location.  Even if one accepts a right to shelter, it does not 
necessarily include the right to shelter in a particular place.  Possession and shelter concern different things –
shelter is concerned with the human need for a home generally, while possession is concerned with a person’s 
connection to one particular home.
80
 Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 64.
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A. Evaluating the Personal Interest In the Home
In Property and Personhood and subsequent works, Radin developed a 
“personhood” theory of property.81  Radin’s theory was based nominally on 
Hegel’s theory of the person, but the core of her analysis was the pragmatic 
observation that people become personally attached to certain types of 
property.  Radin accordingly divided property into two categories –
personal and fungible.  Personal property cannot be completely replaced by 
market value compensation; fungible property in contrast can be replaced
by market value compensation.82
Radin’s classic example was of a wedding ring.  To the jeweler, a 
wedding ring is fungible – the jeweler would be equally happy with one 
ring, another similar ring, or the monetary value of the ring.  Once wedding 
rings are exchanged with a spouse, the rings take on personal meaning and 
cannot be freely replaced with their monetary value.  Other examples 
include personal photographs, heirlooms and, most relevant here, homes.83
Radin observed that on an intuitive level, homes are personal, but did 
not probe the source of this intuition more deeply. The literature on the 
psychology of home provides a more detailed picture of people’s 
relationships to their homes.  Consistent with Radin’s intuition, home is 
associated with a range of feelings related to a long-term tie to a physical 
location.  The home is the physical center of everyday life, and is a source 
of feelings of rootedness and belonging.84  Home is the locus of a person’s 
immediate family,85 and can be a source of emotional warmth and personal 
comfort.86  For people with long-term tenure in their homes, home is a 
source of feelings of continuity, stability and permanence.87  Home is the 
center of individual social networks and provides a physical tie to “one’s 
workplace, school, and other points in the geographical world.”88  Home 
also is associated with personal identity, reflecting both how people see 
themselves and how they want other people to see them.89
Many of these last psychological ties to the home are related to a 
81 See Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 64, passim; Margaret Jane Radin, Residential Rent 
Control, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 350, 365 (1986).
82
 Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 64, at 959 -60.
83 Id. at 959.  Another way of putting the same point is that homes are incompletely commodified; that is, 
that the importance of homes cannot be completely described in monetary terms. See MARGARET JANE RADIN, 
CONTESTED COMMODITIES 108-112 (1996).
84
 Smith, supra note 7, at 32; Zingmark & Norberg, supra note 10, at 50.
85
 Smith, supra note 7, at 33.  Indeed, lack of connection to family can lead the elderly to view their living 
spaces as non-homes. Zingmark & Norberg, supra note 10, at 52.  On the other hand, negative associations with 
family can be tied to negative associations with the home, and issues of intra-family abuse can be a counter-
weight to the value placed on the privacy provided by the home. See supra notes 71 - 73 and accompanying text.
86
 Smith, supra note 7, at 33.
87 Id. at 32.
88 Id. at 33.
89 Id. at 32; Roberta M. Feldman, Settlement-Identity:  Psychological Bonds with Home Places in a Mobile 
Society, 22 ENVIRONMENT & BEHAVIOR 183, 186 (1990).
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particular home in a particular place, and in turn are related to legal issues 
that involve the possession of a home.  A dislocation from the home 
(voluntary or involuntary) involves the loss or alteration of these 
psychological ties, and dislocation can have a negative psychological 
impact on an individual.90  Not all people relate to their homes in the same 
way, however, and dislocation can affect people in different ways.91
Additionally, many important psychological attachments to the home can 
move with an individual to a new home.  For example, when a person 
moves, the zone of privacy, freedom and autonomy also moves.  If the 
home is owned, senses of value and ownership (both components of the 
psychology of home)92 also move. The role of the home as the center of 
family life also can move to a new home, and feelings of personal 
connectedness can move as an individual personalizes a new home and 
moves personal effects that have strong personal meanings.93  Not all 
psychological ties, therefore, are implicated in legal issues related to the 
possession of a home.94
A closer examination thus reveals that the intuitive view tends to 
overstate an individual’s personal connection to a home in a particular 
location, because many of the important personal values associated with a 
home are movable.  Perhaps most importantly, a person will also be able to 
move the personal belongings that are critical to making a new living space 
feel like home.  Each of these movable values are critical components of 
90 See Marc Fried, Grieving for a Lost Home, in Leonard J. Duhl, THE URBAN CONDITION, at 151 (1963); 
see also Mindy Thompson Fullilove, Psychiatric Implications of Displacement:  Contributions from the 
Psychology of Place, 153 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1516 (1996) (“The main proposition presented here is that the sense 
of belonging, which is necessary for psychological well-being, depends on strong, well-developed relationships 
with nurturing places.  A major corollary of this proposition is that disturbance in these essential place 
relationships leads to psychological disorder.”).
91 See Fried, supra note 90;  see also Andrew J. Sixsmith and Judith A. Sixsmith, Transitions in Home 
Experience in Later Life, J. ARCHITECTURAL & PLANNING RESEARCH 181, 186-187 (Vol. 8 No. 3, Autumn, 1991) 
(noting that people who have lived in a home for many years often have strong emotional connections to the 
home).
92 See infra note 156.
93 D. Geoffrey Hayward, HOME AS AN ENVIRONMENTAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCEPT, 7-8 (1975); see 
also Sixsmith & Sixsmith, supra note 91, at 186-87 (noting importance of objects inside the home to a person’s 
feeling of connectedness to the home).  The subjects of Smith’s empirical study often raised the effect of 
personalization on psychological connection to the home, and described environments that could not be 
personalized (e.g., barracks, nurses’ quarters and migrant hotels) as non-homelike. Smith, supra note 7, at 36-41.  
Rybczyncki notes that Jane Austen’s description of her heroine’s room in Mansfield Park evokes the importance 
of personal property to the sense of being at home:
Fanny Price . . . had a room where she could go “after anything unpleasant below, and find 
immediate consolation in some pursuit, or some train of thought at hand.  Her plants, her 
books – of which she had been a collector from the first hour of her commanding a shilling 
– her writing desk, and her works of charity and ingenuity, were all within her reach; or if 
indisposed for employment, if nothing but musing would do, she could scarcely see an 
object in that room which had not an interesting remembrance connected with it.”
RYBCZYNSKI, supra note 50, at 111.
94 Conversely, the mobility of many of the psychologically important aspects of the home reinforces the 
importance of home even in a society where 20% of Americans move each year. See Feldman, supra note 89, at 
185-87.
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people’s psychological ties to their homes, and would therefore be 
significant components of the intuitive notion that homes are special.95
All of this said, there is something to the intuition that there is a 
personal connection to home – the pang of regret, or funny feeling in the
stomach, felt when moving from one home to another. Many of the 
important psychological ties to the home – such as feelings of rootedness, 
permanence and belonging in the community – are not movable.  As a 
result, many people suffer significant negative psychological impacts from 
moving.  This feeling of loss is greater when the move is not voluntary, 
because the sense of dislocation is more severe and because the positive 
factors that lead to a voluntary move would be absent.  Not only would an 
involuntary move dislocate a person from her home, but it would also 
dislocate her from her community, school, job or family.  The personal 
interest in home therefore seems to be something that is both real and 
something that the law should be concerned about, even if the personal 
interest in the home may be less than a general intuition about the home 
might lead us to believe.
Radin did not try to strike a balance between the personal interest in the 
home against competing interests.  Rather, Radin made a broad moral claim 
that the personal interest of a person in possessing a home should trump 
competing fungible interests.96 In the landlord-tenant context, Radin 
therefore asserted that the personal interests of a tenant should be favored 
over the fungible interests of a landlord, and in the debtor-creditor context, 
the personal interest of the homeowner should be favored over the fungible 
interests of a lender.97
Radin’s broad moral claim for favoring the personal interests in 
possession of a home over competing fungible interests is problematic 
because it is based on a general intuitive view of people’s personal 
connection with their homes, rather than a more nuanced view that
recognizes that many important ties to the home are movable.  Radin’s 
claim also is problematic in its trivialization of the competing interests as 
merely fungible.  The analysis in the remainder of this Part, in contrast, tries 
to balance the relative strength of the personal interest in possessing a home 
– which is real and deserving of legal protection, if not as strong as Radin’s 
analysis would suggest – against the competing interests presented by each 
type of legal issue.
95 Indeed, the relative strength of the personal connection cannot be too strong, because it is often overcome 
by other personal interests.  People move voluntarily all the time for innumerable reasons – for example, to take a 
new job, to move to a better home or community, because they have children, or because their children grow up 
and move out of the house.  In an increasingly mobile American society, people move on average once every four 
years. See FISCHEL, supra note 157, at 59-60.
96
 Radin, Residential Rent Control, supra note 81, at 365.
97 Id.
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B. Balancing the Personal Interest In the Home Against Competing 
Interests
This Sub-Part examines a series of legal issues where courts (and less 
often legislatures) have been forced to balance the right to possess a home 
against a competing interest.  The first section looks at issues, many from
debtor-creditor law and landlord-tenant law, where courts and legislatures 
have generally speaking struck an appropriate balance between the 
resident’s personal interest in the home and competing interests.  The 
second section looks at two areas, homestead exemptions and residential 
rent control, where the law has over-protected the personal interest in the 
home.  Finally, the third section examines the treatment of homes in 
eminent domain and equitable distribution law, areas where the personal 
interest in homes is underprotected.
1. Striking the Right Balance
In the past century, a number of legal reforms in the creditor-
homeowner and landlord-tenant contexts have tempered the harsh impact of 
traditional common law rules that often resulted in the displacement of 
people from their homes.  Many of these reforms have struck an appropriate 
balance by protecting the homeowner’s or tenant’s interest in staying in 
their home without substantially harming the competing interest of the 
creditor or landlord.   
Most people who buy a home borrow money from a bank to pay most of 
the purchase price.  If the borrower-homeowner fails to pay the borrowed 
money back, then the lender may enforce the security interest granted by the 
mortgage and foreclose on the home.  All states recognize the debtor’s right 
to purchase the home prior to foreclosure, but many states have redemption 
statutes that allow the homeowner to buy the home back from the 
foreclosure-sale buyer within a period of time after the foreclosure sale is 
completed.98  These rights of redemption limit the creditor’s right to sell the 
property of a defaulting homeowner, but the creditor (or subsequent 
purchaser) is made whole by the redemption payment made by the 
homeowner.
Similar balances are struck in certain areas of landlord-tenant law.  Just-
cause eviction statutes limit the right of a landlord to evict tenants.99
98 See BAXTER DUNAWAY, 2 THE LAW OF DISTRESSED REAL ESTATE:  FORECLOSURE, WORKOUTS, 
PROCEDURES §§ 20:1-20:3 (2004); DAVID A. SCHMUDDE, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO MORTGAGES AND LIENS, 132-
134 (2004); see also Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest In Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 685-86
(1988).
99 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:18-53 (West 2000) (restricting circumstances in which residential tenant can 
be evicted); Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law:  Causes and Consequences, 
69 CORNELL L. REV. 517, 534-35 (1984) (discussing common types of just-cause eviction statutes); Kenneth K. 
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Tenure-rights provisions force landlords to give successive leases to tenants 
under certain circumstances.100  Condominium conversion ordinances often 
give tenants a right of first refusal to purchase their apartment when their 
rental building is converted into a condominium.101  Many of these types of
statutes include exemptions for landlords who are renting part of their own 
home,102 and are intended to limit the landlords’ interests where these 
interests are fungible.  A commercial landlord should not care who is 
renting an apartment so long as the rent is paid and the apartment properly 
maintained.103  Similarly, a landlord converting a rental building to a
condominium should not care who is buying the apartment so long as the 
purchase price is paid. The restrictions placed on the landlord’s common-
law rights by these types of statutes are real and substantial, but these 
restrictions generally speaking are justified by the tenant’s comparatively 
stronger personal interest in remaining in their home.
2. Over-Protecting The Personal Interest In Home
This section discusses two instances where the law overprotects the 
personal interest in possessing a home:  homestead exemptions in some 
states (notably Florida and Texas) that absolutely protect homes from 
foreclosure by creditors and residential rent control.
Baar, Guidelines for Drafting Rent Control Laws:  Lessons of a Decade, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 723, 833-35 (1983) 
(same); see also Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 64, at 994 -95 (discussing balance between interests 
of landlord and tenant struck by just cause eviction statutes); Singer, supra note 98, at 682-84 (same).
100
 New York City’s Rent Stabilization Law, for example, requires landlords to offer tenants renewal leases. 
See N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 26-511(c)(4) (2004); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. TIT. 9 § 2523.5 (2004).  
Combined with just-cause eviction statutes, tenure rights allow tenants to stay in their apartments so long as they 
pay their rent and refrain from engaging in harmful activity.  Although tenure rights themselves are 
unobjectionable if the renewal is at a market rent, the bulk of the Rent Stabilization Law is intended to regulate 
rent.  As with other rent control statutes, these other provisions of the Rent Stabilization Law goes too far in 
protecting the tenant’s possessory interest in the home. See infra notes 119 - 126 and accompanying text. 
101 See, e.g., 765 ILL. CONS. STAT. ANN. 605/30 (West 2001) (giving tenant right of first refusal to purchase 
unit converted to condominium); FLORIDA STAT. ANN. § 718.612 (West 2001) (same).  Condominium conversion 
ordinances often also place far more substantial restrictions on the landlord’s right to convert, at times preventing 
conversion entirely.  See Rabin, supra note 99, at 535 -37; Baar, supra note 99, at 835 -38.  For example, Brookline 
and Cambridge, Massachusetts enacted condominium conversion ordinances that prevented landlords from ever 
converting apartments held by certain classes of tenants to condominiums. See Flynn v. City of Cambridge, 418 
N.E.2d 335, 337 (Mass. 1981) (“In essence, what the ordinance does is require that any unit which is a controlled 
rental unit on August 10, 1979, remain part of the rental housing stock of the city of Cambridge.”); Singer, supra
note 98, at 684, n. 250.  These more severe condominium conversion ordinances, like the rent control ordinances 
with which they often are coupled, go too far in favoring the tenant’s possessory interest in the home. See infra
notes 119 - 126 and accompanying text (discussing over-protection of possession of the home in rent control 
context).
102 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:18-61.1 (West 2000) (exempting “owner-occupied premises with not more 
than two rental units” from scope of just-cause eviction statute); see also Radin, Property and Personhood, supra 
note 64, at 993 (noting that the view of tenants as havin g a more personal connection than landlords to rental 
apartments “is overgeneralized.  Some landlords live in one half of a duplex and rent the other half, or rent the 
remodeled basement or attic of their home.”); Singer, supra note 98, at 684.
103
 Singer, supra note 98, at 683 -84.
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a. Homestead Exemptions
The unlimited homestead exemptions allowed by Florida, Texas and a 
few other states protect the homeowner’s possessory interest by absolutely 
prohibiting the foreclosure of a home by creditors.104 These exemptions are 
widely reviled, and it is not controversial to say that they over-protect the 
possession of the home at the expense of strong creditor’s interests.  The 
putative justification for homestead exemptions generally – to allow the 
debtor family to continue to have shelter105 – can be accomplished by the 
type of exemption common in many states that allows a debtor to protect a 
certain amount of money from creditors, which can be then used to 
purchase or rent a new home.106  The competing interest of creditors is 
substantial.  Business creditors are able to protect themselves to a certain 
extent from the effects of the unlimited homestead exemption – mortgage 
creditors are typically not affected by the exemption, and other business 
creditors can protect themselves by, among other things, raising prices for 
all residents of a state with an unlimited homestead exemption.  In contrast, 
tort creditors – e.g., victims of fraud, malpractice or negligence – do not 
choose their creditors in advance and therefore are unable to protect 
themselves from the unlimited homestead exemption.  The result has been a 
sorry parade of wrongdoers and potential wrongdoers trooping down to 
Florida and Texas to purchase expensive homes protected by the unlimited 
homestead exemption,107 though he potential for abuse was reduced 
recently by bankruptcy reform legislation passed by Congress.108
b. Residential Rent Control
The attention given to residential rent control by legal academia perhaps 
is out of proportion to its real world impact – relatively few municipalities 
in the United States have active residential rent control regulations, and the 
recent trend has been for rent controls to be abolished or weakened.109  But 
104 FLA. CONST. Art. X, § 4; TEXAS CONST. Art. 16, § 50; see also S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-45-3; KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 60-2301; IOWA CODE ANN. § 561.16.
105 See Public Health Trust v. Lopez, 531 So. 2d. 946, 948 (Fla. 1988).
106 See, e.g., CAL. CONST. ART. XX, § 1.5 (“The Legislature shall protect, by law, from forced sale a certain 
portion of the homestead and other property of all heads of families.” (emphasis supplied)).  Another reasonable 
approach to the treatment of debtor’s homes is found in the tax code, where a taxpayer’s residence may only be 
seized as a last resort, and only after approval in writing by a U.S. District Court. See 26 U.S.C. § 6334(a)(13)(B) 
and (e).
107 See G. Marcus Coles, The Federalist Cost of Bankruptcy Exemption Reform, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 227 
(2000); Wells M. Engledow, Cleaning Up the Pigsty: Approaching a Consensus on Exemption Laws, 74 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 275 (2000); Richard Lombino, Uniformity of Exemptions: Assessing the Commission’s Proposals, 6 
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 177, 198- 202 (1998).
108
 The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 prevents debtors in federal 
bankruptcy cases from using the unlimited homestead exemptions for homes that have been owned for less than 
forty months. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(p)(1).
109
 For example, Massachusetts abolished rent control in 1994 and California substantially reduced the scope 
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rent control does provide a good window into academic thought about how 
to balance between the property interests of landlords, tenants and other 
members of the community.
Radin is among the most prominent defenders of rent control.  The 
centerpiece of her argument in favor of rent control is that the personal
interest in the home trumps competing, fungible interests:
[M]y claim is simply that the private home is a justifiable form of personal 
property, while a landlord’s interest is often fungible.  A tenancy, no less than a 
single-family house, is the sort of property interest in which a person becomes 
self-invested; and after the self-investment has taken place, retention of the 
interest becomes a priority claim over curtailment of merely fungible interests of 
others.110
Radin bolsters her assertion that the tenant’s personal interest should control 
over the landlord’s fungible interest by comparing the legal treatment given 
to tenants and homeowners.  Just as homeowners are given “special 
concessions” such as homestead exemptions and rights of redemption in 
foreclosure that protect their possessory interest in their homes, “it also 
seems right to safeguard the tenant from losing her home even if it means 
some curtailment of the landlord’s interest.”111  So, too, it makes sense to 
Radin to favor the interests of current tenants over the interests of tenants 
who are new to the market, who have not yet become personally connected 
to their home.112
As discussed above in the context of just cause eviction statutes, 
condominium conversion ordinances and tenure rights, it does make sense 
to make “some curtailment” of a landlord’s interest to protect a tenant’s 
personal interest in possessing the home.113  The issue is where to strike the 
balance between the competing interests.  Just as absolute homestead 
exemptions go too far in favoring a homeowner’s possessory interest over a 
competing interest,114 rent control goes too far in favoring a tenant’s interest 
against a host of competing interests that are harmed by rent control.115
The price of the benefit conferred by rent control on long-term tenants is 
born by a wide range of other members of the community.  New tenants are 
harmed by being forced to pay higher rents due to the absence from the 
of rent control in 1996. See MASS. GEN. LAWS 40P § 4 (West 2004); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1954.50 et seq. (West 
Supp. 2005).
110
 Radin, Residential Rent Control, supra note 81, at 365.
111 Id. at 365-66.
112 See Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 64, at 994.
113 See supra notes 102 - 106 and accompanying text.
114 See supra notes 107 - 111 and accompanying text.
115
 The fact that homeowners are given excessive protection of their possessory interests does not justify 
similarly excessive protections being given to tenants.  As Richard Epstein noted in refuting the similar argument 
that the subsidization of homeowners by the tax code justifies rent control subsidization of tenants, two wrongs 
don’t make a right.  See Richard A. Epstein, Rent Control Revisited:  One Reply to Seven Critics, 54 BROOK. L. 
REV. 1281, 1294 (1989).  
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housing market of the apartments subject to rent control.116  The very poor 
are harmed by a decrease in available housing caused by the negative 
impact of rent control on the incentive of landlords to maintain or create 
housing stock.117  Landlords are harmed by a profound limitation placed on 
their property rights by rent control.118  Homeowners in a neighborhood 
with rent-controlled apartments are harmed by the negative impact that rent 
control has on home values.119  In addition to these negative impacts on 
other members of the community, rent control has been widely criticized as 
being an ineffective tool for two of its purported policy goals, providing 
housing to the poor and redistributing wealth to the poor. Although there 
are some dissenting views, the consensus among economists is that rent 
control has been ineffective in providing affordable housing to the poor and 
has had negative effects on housing markets where rent control is present.120
116 See Radin, Residential Rent Control, supra note 81, at 365.
117 See ANTHONY DOWNS, A REEVALUATION OF RENT CONTROLS, 4 (1996); FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 82.
118
 Rent control allows a tenant to stay in an apartment at a below-market price, not only restricting the 
landlord’s common-law right to rent to someone else at the end of a lease term but restricting the landlord’s right 
to make market returns from the property.  This is a far more substantial impact on the landlord’s property rights 
than simple tenure rights, which allow a tenant to stay in the home so long as they are willing to pay market rent. 
See supra note 103 and accompanying text.  The result of rent control is to transfer to the tenant a portion of the 
economic benefits of ownership.  The law has long made a distinction between ownership and tenancy, and this 
distinction is not a mere relic of feudal property law.  Owners own, with all of the benefits and risks that 
ownership presents.  Tenants rent, with perhaps fewer benefits and fewer risks. See infra Part III (discussing 
disparate treatment of freeholds and leaseholds). Curtis Berger argued that “The salient difference between the 
tenant and homeowner lies in the equity buildup (and possible equity loss) that accompanies ownership.” Curtis J. 
Berger, Home Is Where The Heart Is:  A Brief Reply to Professor Epstein, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 1239, 1240-41 
(1989).  Berger noted that many first-time homebuyers do not have a substantial equity stake when they first buy 
their homes, and argued that in the amount of time that it would take for a homebuyer to develop a substantial 
amount of equity both a tenant and homeowner would have an equivalent personal connection to their home. Id.
As a result, Berger argued, ownership should not give homeowners more of a right to stay in their home than 
renters. Id.  Berger’s argument, however, is based on a flawed premise – there is far more to the difference 
between ownership and rental than the amount of equity an owner actually has in a home.  Even a homeowner 
with minimal equity in a home is fully exposed to the gains and losses that result from fluctuations of the housing 
market.  Indeed, it is this undiversified exposure to the housing market that makes homeowners such active 
citizens in local affairs, providing, among other things, a republican justification for favoring homeowners over 
renters. See FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 3-6, 10-12; infra notes 158 - 164 and accompanying text (discussing 
republican arguments for favoring homeowners); see also Epstein, One Reply to Seven Critics, supra note 115, at 
1293-94 (noting that because a tenant does not have a substantial portion of assets tied up in her home, she is 
better able to diversify her investments).  It is true that long-term tenants and homeowners might have a similar 
emotional attachment to a home, see Berger, supra, at 1240-41, but this does not mean that the long-term tenant’s 
personal interest in a home is sufficient to justify a radical transfer of the landlord’s property rights to the tenant.
Describing his connection to his own rent-controlled apartment, Berger said that “Knowing that I am secure in 
that attachment, and that the landlord’s whim or a stranger’s ‘higher bid’ can not destroy these rooted 
associations, is essential to my sense of identity.” Berger, supra, at 1240-41.  Perhaps Berger’s personal 
connection to his home justifies protecting him from his “landlord’s whim,” but if he wanted to be protected from 
a ‘higher bid’ he could have, and should have, purchased, not rented.  Like many beneficiaries of rent control, 
Berger had the opportunity to buy, but decided not to, not because he couldn’t afford it, but because his subsidized 
rent was a better deal than buying. See id. at 1240 n.5.
119 See FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 82 (explaining that rent control negatively impacts home values by 
reducing the quality of housing stock, which will be reflected in housing prices in neighboring areas, and by 
increasing the tax burden on homeowners, which will be capitalized into home values.).
120 See DOWNS, supra note 117, at 2-4 (summarizing economic studies on rent control and concluding that 
“All rent controls are unjust to owners of existing rental units, inefficient as anti-poverty policies, and damaging 
to some of the very low-income renters they are supposed to protect.  Moreover, most of the benefits produced by 
rent controls aid moderate-, middle-, and upper-income households, rather than the poor households they may 
have been adopted to help.”); but see JOHN I. GOLDERBLOOM & RICHARD P. APPELBAUM, RETHINKING RENTAL 
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Rent control is a poor tool for wealth redistribution because its one class of 
economic winners are long-term tenants, who are not necessarily (indeed, 
are not typically) poor.  
One important aspect of the personal interest in possessing a home is 
that it provides a tie to the community.121  A person forced to move may 
become separated from family, friends, school and workplace.  Radin and 
others making a moral case for rent control unsurprisingly include a strong 
appeal to community in their arguments.  The case for rent control, 
however, is an odd communitarian argument in that rent control favors one 
discrete class of people – long-term tenants – at the expense of the rest of 
the community.  Other tenants (both those in non-controlled apartments and 
prospective tenants who wish to join the community), the very poor, 
landlords and homeowners all suffer because of rent control.  The 
community as a whole suffers because rent control can stifle the organic 
change that makes cities dynamic places.  As Richard Epstein observed in 
criticizing Radin’s position on rent control:
It is very risky to announce that some persons or some roles count for more than 
others.  Potential entrants to certain markets are real people whose goals, 
aspirations, and desires matter as much as those of present tenants. . . . It is often 
very difficult to know whether neighborhood stability is a source of strength or 
stagnation, and whether mobility is a sign of vitality or decay.122
The community as a whole also suffers by the incentives created by rent 
control for long-term tenants to stay tenants, rather than become owners 
with more of a stake in community affairs.123
HOUSING, at 134, 149 (1988) (questioning assertion that rent control has a negative impact on quality or supply of 
rental housing, but noting that rent control has not reduced rents to affordable levels).
121 See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
122 Richard A. Epstein, Rent Control and the Theory of Efficient Regulation, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 741, 771-72 
(1989).  Epstein goes on to observe that:
Economic accounts of efficiency have been attacked countless times because they leave out 
the social equation fundamental concerns with justice and fairness that are thought to be an 
inseparable part of our social life.  How ironic that those tests are the only ones that direct 
our attention toward the overall effects of the purported regulation – including the losses to 
landlords and potential tenants, as well as to society at large – that the ‘communitarian’ 
approaches ignore.
Id.  These are fair points, especially with respect to rent control.  But the economic analysis advocated by Epstein 
does not tell the whole story.  The personal interest in possession of a home is not illusory, and economic theory 
doesn’t seem to be able to fully value possession of home absent a voluntary transaction.  Even in the presence of 
a voluntary transaction, people tend to act in a manner that appears to be economically irrationally about their 
homes, and this “irrational” overvaluation can be seen as an expression of the individual’s personal interest in the 
home. See infra notes 144 - 147   Radin’s argument is a moral one, and fails in this context because it overvalues 
the personal interest in the home while undervaluing the damage caused to the rest of the community by rent 
control.
123 Traditional republican political theory supports favoritism of homeownership over renting because the 
benefits and risks presented by ownership spur owners to be more involved and responsible citizens. See William 
H. Simon, Social Republican Property, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1335, 1356-58 (1991).  This theoretical position is 
supported by empirical evidence that homeowners in fact are more involved in community affairs than renters.
See infra notes 158 - 164 and accompanying text.  Rent control provides something of a middle ground between
ownership and renting in this context, because tenants in a rent-controlled apartment are able to share some of the 
fruits of community improvement where typical renters may get priced out of their homes as rental prices increase 
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3. Underprotection of the Personal Interest In the Home
This sub-part examines areas of the law where the personal interest in 
home is in some instances given too little protection.  In family law, some 
jurisdictions do not give sufficient weight to the unique nature of home in 
allocating the home in divorce cases.  In eminent domain law, the home is 
underprotected both in the level of scrutiny given to government takings of 
homes and in the amount of compensation awarded for those takings.
a. Family Law
As discussed above, the modern conceptions of home, privacy and 
family evolved together with the emergence of the bourgeois class in 
Europe.124  Prior to that time, the home did not contain a family unit that 
would be recognizable to the modern eye.  During the Middle Ages, 
children were sent away around age seven to become pages, apprentices or 
servants, depending on their parents’ social position.125 Indeed, the concept 
of childhood did not truly exist to the medieval mind.  Rather, age 
in an improving market. See FISCHEL, supra note 157, at 86; Simon, supra, at 1356-58.  The rent-controlled 
tenant, however, shares far less of the risk of community decline because the tenant can move to another location 
without suffering the financial loss that would face a similarly-situated homeowner.  Similarly, the rent-controlled 
tenant shares less of the potential benefit of community improvement because the tenant does not share the 
owner’s financial upside from community improvement.  For example, a tenant in a rent-controlled apartment will 
be less likely than an owner to participate heavily in local public school issues.  If the tenant does become heavily 
involved in improving the local public schools, the tenant will benefit by being able to send her children to better 
schools and will be protected from being priced out of her home by the increase in property values caused by 
school improvement.  The tenant, however, will not share in the benefits of those increased values as would a 
homeowner, because of the lack of equity ownership in a rented home.  The traditional republican interest of 
encouraging responsible citizenship would therefore continue to favor ownership over renting, whether rent-
controlled or not.
Simon adds concerns for social justice and for motivating people to remain in their community to traditional 
republican theory to develop a social-republican theory of property.  Simon’s social-republican model values 
ownership because it places the risk of community decline on the owner, but is suspicious of ownership in part 
because ownership allows the owner to the benefits of community improvements and to remove those benefits 
from the community by selling the property.  Simon acknowledges that rent control protects a tenant from losses 
that his social-republican model would ideally place on members of the community, but argues that rent-control 
encourages community by forcing the tenant to stay in place to share the benefits of community improvement. See
Simon, supra, at 1360-61 (“She can enjoy, without cost, increases in the value of the premises due, for example, 
to improvements in the community, but she can enjoy them only in kind and must remain in place to do so.”).  
Simon’s point about the inability of rent-controlled tenants to take the benefits of community improvement with 
them when they move is an interesting one.  But Simon’s social-republican model is an odd amalgam of 
republican and communitarian ideals, recognizing that self-interest is a powerful motivator but going only 
halfway because of a hostility to individual profit.  On balance, ownership seems to be a superior motivator for 
community involvement because the homeowner is exposed to all of the risks of community decline and more of 
the benefits of community improvement than a rent-controlled tenant.  A more important flaw in Simon’s theory, 
however, is that it fails to confront the very real costs imposed by rent-control.  Where Radin’s theory justifies 
rent control with a moral claim about an individual’s personal connection to the home, Simon’s theory justifies 
rent control with a moral claim about an individual’s connection to the community. See id. at 1361.  But like 
Radin’s theory based on the personal connection to the home, Simon’s community-based moral claim seems 
insufficient to outweigh the harm that rent control imposes on the community as a whole and on individual 
members of the community who are not beneficiaries of rent control. See supra notes 118 -125 and accompanying 
text.
124 See supra notes 50 - 61 and accompanying text.
125 RYBCZYNSKI, supra note 50, at 48 -49.
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groupings were divided into infants (those under age seven, who were still 
dependent on maternal care) and adults.126  It was not until the development 
of formal schooling in the Sixteenth Century that the concept of childhood 
as a separate stage of life began to emerge,127 and the modern conception of 
family started to emerge as children of the bourgeois began to live at home 
during their school years.128
It therefore is not surprising that home and family are strongly linked as 
contemporary cultural and psychological ideas.129 One area of law that 
126
 Id. at 48-49, 60; Aries, supra note 54,  at 128, 411.  As Aries explained:
In medieval society, the idea of childhood did not exist; this is not to suggest that children 
were neglected, forsaken or despised.  The idea of childhood is not to be confused with 
affection for children:  it corresponds to an awareness of the particular nature of childhood, 
that particular nature which distinguishes the child from the adult, even the young adult.  In 
medieval society this awareness was lacking.  That is why, as soon as the child could live 
without the constant solicitude of his mother, his nanny or his cradle-rocker, he belonged to 
adult society.
ARIES, supra note 54,  at 128.
127 RYBCZYNSKI, supra note 50, at 48 -49; ARIES, supra note 54, at 369.
128 RYBCZYNSKI, supra note 50, at 48 -49.
129
 The link between family and home does not mean that a dwelling inhabited by a single person, or a non-
traditional family, is any less of a home.  Some critics have attacked the ideology of home as part of a larger 
ideology of domesticity that has been used as a justification for discrimination against people who do not conform 
to traditional roles. See Williams, supra note 2, at 328-29; Schnably, supra note 73, at 366-68.  Schnably therefore 
warns against “any simple blessing of the traditional home,” Schnably, supra note 73,  at 367 (emphasis supplied), 
and Williams argues that “[i]n its default mode,” the ideology of home “reinscribes traditional white middle class 
gender roles.” Williams, supra, at 329.  These are valid arguments for broadening our view of home life and 
gender roles, but are not arguments for changing our legal concept of home.  “Non-traditional” families following 
non-traditional gender roles have homes, and should be entitled to the same benefits of home as traditional 
families.  Indeed, one goal of advocates for same-sex marriage is to give same-sex couples the same legal rights to 
their homes as opposite-sex couples. See, e.g., Adam Chase, Tax Planning for Same-Sex Couples, 72 DEN. U. L. 
REV. 395 (1995); Ryan Nishimoto, Book Note, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J., 379, 390 (2003) (reviewing THE GAY 
RIGHTS QUESTION IN CONTEMPORARY LAW, (2002)); Liz Seaton, Debate Over Denial of Marriage Rights and 
Benefits to Same-Sex Couples and their Children, 4 MARGINS 127, 142-43 (2004).
In an early-Twentieth-Century critique of the traditional home, Charlotte Perkins Gilman noted, among other 
things, that the home could survive the absence of a woman who worked outside of the home. See GILMAN, supra
note 11.  But while critical of those aspects of the traditional ideal of home that relegated women to domestic 
roles, Gillman was positive about the home generally:  “The home in its essential nature is pure good, and in its 
due development is progressively good; but it must change with society’s advance; and the kind of home that is 
wholly beneficial in one century may be largely evil in another.” Id. at 8.  The same holds true today –
conceptions of family and domesticity should not remain static, but the importance of home to families, however 
defined, remains compelling.
A similarly misplaced criticism focuses on the archetypal single-family suburban home, upon which some 
critics of the American ideology of home have focused their ire. See Williams, supra note 2, at 328-29; Schnably, 
supra note 73,  at 366-68.  Because of their focus on suburbia, these criticisms come across, at least in part, as 
elitist polemics against a 1950’s Leave It To Beaver caricature of suburban life, where the suburbs are populated 
exclusively by white, heterosexual families with a working father and stay-at-home mother. See Williams, supra
note 2, at 328-29; Schnably, supra note 73, at 366-68.  (As part of his riff against suburbia, Schnably references 
that hated institution, the suburban shopping mall. Schnably, supra note 73, at 368.  Shopping malls have little, if 
anything, to do with the broad concept of home discussed here.  Schnably’s reference, however, certainly was an 
effective academic rhetorical device – it is hard to imagine a cultural phenomenon that has provoked more 
academic scorn than the mall.).  This caricature of American suburbia is increasingly inaccurate, but more 
importantly, criticism of a caricature of the traditional suburban home fails as a criticism of the larger concept of 
home.  Home as a concept is far broader than a detached suburban home inhabited by a traditional nuclear family.  
“Home” includes urban apartments, both rented and owned, and many of the legal protections given to homes 
apply as strongly to rented homes as to owned homes. See Radin, Residential Rent Control, supra note 81, at  365 
(arguing that a residential tenancy is a “home” in the same sense as an owned dwelling, and should be given the 
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squarely involves the relationship between family and home is the award of 
a family home in divorce cases.  Courts considering post-divorce property 
distributions in cases where minor children are still living at home are likely 
to view possession of a home as presenting complex issues beyond the 
equitable financial division of the marital property, and to want to award the 
home to the custodial parent to minimize the impact of the divorce on the 
children.130  As one court, using language reflecting the personal possessory 
interest in the home, explained:
The value of the family home to its occupants cannot be measured solely by its 
value in the marketplace.  The longer the occupancy, the more important these 
non-economic factors become and the more traumatic and disruptive a move to a 
new environment is to children whose roots have become firmly entwined in the 
school and social milieu of the neighborhood.131
Many jurisdictions, recognizing the potential negative impact on 
children, give special treatment to the marital home in divorce cases.132
These jurisdictions do not categorically require an award of the marital 
home to a custodial parent, nor should they – the complexity of property 
distribution in divorce cases makes categorical rules undesirable.133  Rather, 
these jurisdictions appropriately recognize the importance of the possessory 
interest in the home by giving courts flexibility to consider the interest of 
children in staying in their home in making a property award.134
same moral weight as an owned home).  As noted above, “home” also includes the dwellings of individuals, 
single parents, gays and lesbians and other “non-traditional” households.
As a result, Schnably’s and Williams’s arguments against the traditional conception of the home are not 
compelling arguments against the concept of home generally.  Certain conceptions of home deserve criticism, and 
the ideology of home should not stand unquestioned. See, e.g., supra note 71 (discussing use of the ideology of 
home by courts as a basis to decline to impose punishment for domestic abuse).  But home as a whole is a 
powerful and positive institution that is able to withstand criticism and change.  It therefore is important to temper 
criticism of the home with a recognition of its many positive characteristics.  See Margaret Jane Radin, Lacking a 
Transformative Social Theory:  A Response, 45 STAN. L. REV. 409, 423-24 (1993) (taking a sympathetic view of 
Schnably’s critique, but noting the difficulty presented by the tension between the positive and negative aspects of 
the ideology of home).
130 See Martha F. Davis, The Marital Home:  Equal or Equitable Distribution?, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1089, 
1089-90 (1983).
131
 Duke v. Duke, 101 Cal. App. 3d 152, 155-56 (1980).
132 See Davis, supra note 130, at 1104-11 (discussing approaches taken by various jurisdictions to give 
courts flexibility in awarding the marital home to a custodial spouse).
133 See id.  Some jurisdictions apply something close to a categorical rule, where possession of the marital 
home usually is given to the spouse who has custody of minor children though other interests may be considered 
in exceptional circumstances. See, e.g., Goldblum v. Goldblum, 754 N.Y.S.2d 32, 33 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2003); 
Sanney v. Sanney, 511 S.E.2d 865, 869 (W.Va. S. Ct. 1998); Cabrera v. Cabrera, 484 So.  2d 1338, 1339 (Fla. Ct. 
App. 1986); In re Anderson, 541 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Col. Ct. App. 1975).  Courts applying this rule have made it 
clear that the minor children’s interest in remaining in their home should generally be paramount. Goldblum, 754 
N.Y.S.2d at 33 (noting that minor children had lived in marital home all or most of their lives and awarding 
exclusive possession of marital home to custodial parent); Sanney, 511 S.E.2d at 869 (holding that the focus of the 
inquiry “should be what will promote the best interests of the parties’ children”); Cabrera, 484 So. 2d at 1340 
(“[T]he breakup of their parents’ marriage is . . . a severe trauma to young children; this additional physical and 
psychological dislocation [from the family home] should not be imposed upon them unless there is a very good 
reason indeed for doing so.” (alteration original; citation omitted)); Anderson, 541 P.2d at 1276 (noting that it was 
“particularly important” to award custody to “the spouse having custody of the minor children” when the minor 
child “was under the care of a psychiatrist [and] might be further disturbed by the dislocation if forced to move 
away from the home, neighborhood school, and friends.”).
134 See Davis, supra note 130, at 1104-11.
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In other jurisdictions, however, mechanical rules requiring an equal 
division of marital property may lead to the forced sale of the marital home 
even in circumstances where a court otherwise believes it appropriate to 
allocate the home to the custodial parent.135 While equal division of 
property between the spouses may in the abstract be a laudatory goal, this 
goal should not categorically outweigh the personal possessory interest of 
minor children in staying in the marital home.  By removing flexibility, 
mandatory equal division rules result in the underprotection of the 
possessory interest in the home.
b. Eminent Domain Law
Eminent domain gives the government a broad power to take private 
property in return for just compensation.  Governments often use the 
eminent domain power to take homes, sometimes using the power to 
condemn entire neighborhoods for large-scale development projects.  
Recognition that the personal interest in the home is a real interest 
deserving legal protection suggests that current eminent domain doctrine 
should be modified in two respects.  First, courts and legislatures should 
impose higher levels of judicial scrutiny and additional process protections 
to help ensure that homes taken by exercises of eminent domain are in fact 
required for public use.  Second, courts and legislatures should change their 
approach to awards of just compensation, which currently focuses only on 
the “fair market value” of the property, to take the personal interest in the 
home into account.
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kelo v. City of New London136
has brought the issue of government takings of homes into widespread 
public discussion.  Kelo involved New London’s attempt to use eminent 
domain to take private homes and in turn transfer the property to a private 
developer.  The core legal issue in the case was whether the purported state 
interest in the taking – spurring economic development – qualified as a 
“public use” that justified the exercise of eminent domain.  The Court 
answered affirmatively, and allowed New London to proceed with the 
takings.
In one sense the Court’s holding in Kelo was not at all surprising.  In 
two previous cases, the Court had held that eminent domain could be used 
to take property and in turn transfer it to a private party so long as the taking 
135 See id. at 1097-1101 (discussing effect of equal division rules on allocation of the marital home).  As 
their name implies, equal division rules require marital property to be divided equally between the spouses.  If (as 
is typical) the marital home is the largest marital asset, equal division will often require the sale of the marital 
home to achieve financial equality in the distribution between the two spouses. See id.
136
 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
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served a public purpose.137  The Court also made it clear in those cases that 
courts should give great deference to legislative determinations of what 
constitutes a public purpose.138 Kelo therefore can be seen as simply 
following this trend of a flexible interpretation of “public use” and judicial 
deference to the legislative branch.
In another sense, however, Kelo is both surprising and disappointing.  
Neither of the Court’s leading pre-Kelo precedents on public use had 
concerned the involuntary taking of a person’s home.139 Kelo therefore 
offered the Court the opportunity to at least consider applying a higher level 
of scrutiny to the taking of homes.  The Opinion of the Court, however, did
not even discuss the possibility that homes could be treated differently than 
other types of property in the eminent domain context.  In light of the litany 
of areas where homes are given special legal treatment discussed in the 
prior portions of this Article, the Court’s failure to address the unique nature 
of the home is striking.
Because of substantial public backlash against Kelo, state and federal 
legislators have begun to consider statutory responses that would restrict the 
scope of what constitutes a public use in the eminent domain context.  Most 
of the proposed statutes seek to make blanket alterations in the allowable 
scope of public use, either by expressly prohibiting the kind of economic 
development taking that was involved in Kelo or by prohibiting courts from 
interpreting “public use” to mean “public purpose.”140 These approaches, 
however, may paint with too broad a brush.  Negative public reaction to 
Kelo appears to be focused on fears that homes could be taken for 
commercial development, and the taking of homes presents very different 
interests than the taking of other types of property.  In the case of a home, 
the owner has a strong personal interest in maintaining possession; in the 
case of commercial property or undeveloped land, the owner’s interest is 
likely to be fungible.141
Legislatures therefore should consider focusing their statutory response 
137 See Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241-42 (1984); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33-
35 (1954).
138 Id.
139 Midkiff involved a unique situation where eminent domain was being used to transfer ownership to a 
rented home from the landlord to the tenant. 467 U.S. at 232-33.  As a result, the resident of the home (the tenant) 
was not being displaced by the exercise of eminent domain.  Berman involved the taking of a department store as 
part of an urban renewal program. 348 U.S. at 31.  The issue of the taking of homes to transfer to a private 
developer had been presented in the notorious Poletown case, where the Supreme Court of Michigan allowed 
Detroit to condemn an entire neighborhood and displace thousands of residents from their homes to clear land for 
the construction of a General Motors plant. Poletown Neighborhood Counsel v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 
(Mich. 1981).  Poletown was recently overruled in Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004), though 
like Kelo, Wayne did not consider the possibility that homes could be treated differently than other types of 
property in the eminent domain context.
140
 [Citations will be added for this paragraph as the legislative response develops in the late summer; so far 
legislation has been proposed at the federal level and in at least twenty-five states].
141 See supra notes 82 - 83 and accompanying text (discussing the distinction between personal and fungible 
property).
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to Kelo on giving additional protection to homes while maintaining the 
flexibility of municipalities to use eminent domain more broadly in other 
contexts.  Additional protection for homes could take several forms.  
Legislatures could restrict the scope of public use by, for example, 
prohibiting the taking of homes for purposes of economic development.
The personal possessory interest in homes, however, justifies giving
additional protection to homes even for non-controversial uses such as 
roads and schools.  Legislatures therefore could permit municipalities to 
take a home only after making a finding that the property could not be 
purchased voluntarily and that there was no reasonable alternative course of 
action that would achieve the same public goal without taking the home.  
Legislatures could take other steps to encourage municipalities to take 
homes only as a last resort, for example by requiring the payment of a 
premium above fair market value as compensation for taking a home.142
Independent of the issue of discouraging the taking of homes, the 
current compensation standard for the taking of homes warrants 
reconsideration.  American eminent domain law presently limits 
compensation for takings to fair market value, or “‘what a willing buyer 
would pay in cash to a willing seller’ at the time of the taking.”143  This 
standard, of course, is an artifice in any exercise of eminent domain, 
because the seller is by definition not willing to part with the property 
voluntarily.  As Judge Posner has observed,
[M]arket value is not the value that every owner of property attaches to his 
property but merely the value that the marginal owner attaches to his property.  
Many owners are “intramarginal” meaning that because of relocation costs, 
sentimental attachments, or the special suitability of the property for their 
particular (perhaps idiosyncratic) needs, they value their property at more than its 
market value (i.e., it is not “for sale”).  Such owners are hurt when the government 
takes their property and gives them just its market value in return.  The taking in 
effect confiscates the additional (call it “personal”) value that they obtain from the 
property . . . .144
142 See infra notes 143 - 155 and accompanying text.
143
 United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979) (quoting United States v. Miller, 317 
U.S. 369, 374 (1943); see also JACK L. KNETSCH, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND COMPENSATION:  COMPULSORY 
ACQUISITION AND OTHER LOSSES 37 (1983) (noting that in most jurisdictions owners are not compensated for 
their full reserve value in their property).
144
 Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 464 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J.) (emphasis 
original).  Knetsch makes a similar observation:
When property is taken in this manner, owners cannot hold out for a sum that at least 
compensates them for what they feel they are giving up, as would be the case in a voluntary 
sale. . . . Most owners are unwilling to sell their holdings at the prevailing market prices, 
not because they are irrational or unreasonable, but simply because they place a higher 
value on the particular properties than other people do. . . . As current owners have 
previously selected their property from among others available to them and have likely 
increased their degree of preference through familiarity with the neighborhood and 
emotional attachments, in most cases owners will view their holding as more valuable than 
any similarly priced but less familiar substitute that could be purchased.
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Undervaluation of the taken property may be less of a problem when the 
property in question is undeveloped or commercial.145  But when the taken 
property is a home, market value compensation fails to compensate the 
owner for the personal interest in the home.
The Supreme Court implicitly has recognized that market value 
compensation fails to fully compensate the property owner, but has stuck 
with the market value standard because of the “serious practical difficulties 
in assessing the worth an individual places on particular property at a given 
time.”146  Placing a monetary value on the personal interest in the home is 
admittedly difficult,147 though not insurmountable.148 Objective measures 
could be added to the fair market value of taken homes by either courts or 
legislatures.  Homeowners could be reimbursed for reasonable moving 
expenses149 or reasonable attorney’s fees if successful in contesting the 
government’s valuation of their property.  Further, taken homes could be 
compensated at a fixed premium over fair market value, or a premium tied 
to a sliding scale that increased with the length of residence in the home.150
Such a premium admittedly would be arbitrary (though a premium based on 
length of residence would be less arbitrary than a flat premium),151 but
would be no more arbitrary than the present system of fair market value 
compensation.  Each of these approaches would come closer to making the 
homeowner whole.  They also would provide incentives for governments to 
obtain property through voluntary market transactions rather than through 
eminent domain, and to take homes only when truly needed for the public 
interest.152
KNETSCH, supra note 143, at 36, 39, 40.
145
 Even with undeveloped or commercial property, the property at issue may have unique value to the 
owner; in such a case, the owner is undercompensated by market value compensation.
146 United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. at 511.
147 See KNETSCH, supra note 143, at 38, 49-53 (discussing objections to compensating owners for the 
personal interest in their property and responses to those objections); Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of 
Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 82-85 (1986); Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning:  Covenants, 
Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 736-37 (1973).  As Judge Posner put it:
Many people place a value on their homes that exceeds its market price.  But a standard of 
subjective value in eminent domain cases, while the correct standard as a matter of 
economic principle, would be virtually impossible to administer because of the difficulty of 
proving . . . that the house was worth more the owner than the market price.
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 531 (6th ed. 2003)
148
 For example, Robert Ellickson has suggested that a system of legislatively-defined schedules could be set 
up to award people additional compensation beyond market value. See Ellickson, supra note 147, at 736-37.
149 Federal law provides for payment of relocation expenses and other replacement costs for people displaced 
by the acquisition of property for a federal project. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4622, 4623.
150
 English law at one time awarded a customary ten percent premium in all takings cases to “soften the blow 
of compulsory acquisition.” KEITH DAVIES, THE LAW OF COMPULSORY PURCHASE AND COMPENSATION, at 136 
(4th ed. 1984) (quoting Lord Denning in Harvey v. Crawley Dev. Corp., 1 QB 485 (1957)).
151
 Length of residence is a significant component of a person’s connection to a home people’s ties to their 
homes but may be in particular circumstances be outweighed by other factors. See Fried, supra note 90, at 154 -55.  
Length of residence therefore is not a perfect measure of personal connection to a home.
152 See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
34 HOME AS A LEGAL CONCEPT
DRAFT-8/12/ 2005
Alternatively, the courts (whether on their own initiative or pursuant to 
legislative mandate) could tackle the difficulty of subjectively valuing the 
personal interest in the home.  In other contexts, such as personal injury and 
emotional distress, the law often confronts hard issues of quantifying 
damages when necessary to fully compensate an injured person.
Particularly where there is a Constitutional mandate that compensation be 
just,153 there is a strong argument that the courts should be willing to accept 
the difficulties of fully compensating property owners for the personal 
interest in their homes.  This said, the uniqueness of each person’s 
relationship to their home may make principled compensation decisions 
impossible.
III. FREEHOLDS, LEASEHOLDS AND CITIZENSHIP
In many of the legal contexts considered in the foregoing sections, there 
is no apparent reason to treat owned homes differently than rented homes.  
In all of the issues relating to security, autonomy and privacy considered in 
Part I, a resident’s interest in the home is the same regardless of whether the 
home is owned or rented.  The landlord-tenant issues discussed in Part II, 
however, do involve disparate treatment of owners and renters.  Implicit in 
the discussion of just-cause eviction statutes and residential rent control is 
the fact that ordinarily tenants lose their right to possess their home at the 
expiration of their tenancy.  In contrast, an owner’s right to an owned home 
expires (absent an unusual circumstance such as an exercise of eminent 
domain) only when the owner voluntarily transfers ownership of the 
home.154  Generally speaking, this disparate treatment makes perfect sense 
because it is simply a reflection of the inherent difference between a 
freehold estate of unlimited duration and a leasehold estate of limited 
duration.  An owner owns, and a renter rents.
Beyond the inherent differences between freeholds and leaseholds, 
favoritism of ownership may be justified by a desire to encourage good 
citizenship. As William Fischel notes in The Homevoter Hypothesis, there 
is hard evidence that homeowners are “more likely [than renters] to 
participate in school board meetings, vote in local elections, and otherwise 
participate in community affairs.”155 Results of national and local surveys 
show that homeowners vote more often in local elections than renters – in 
153 See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
154
 The loss of a home to a mortgage foreclosure can be seen as involuntary at the time of foreclosure, but the 
homeowner voluntarily gave up sole ownership of the property when the mortgage was first executed.
155 FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 12.  “Even after controlling for other economic and demographic differences 
between homeowners and renters, [studies have] found that homeowners were more conscientious citizens and 
were more effective in providing community amenities.”  Id.; see also Roberta F. Mann, The (Not So) Little House 
on the Prairie:  The Hidden Costs of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1347, 1354-57 
(2000).
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one national survey, by a 77 percent to 52 percent margin.156 The majority 
of Americans own homes, and for most of these homeowners, their home is 
their single most valuable asset.157 Fischel’s thesis is that the importance of 
preserving the value of their homes is the key factor that motivates 
homeowners to be more active citizens, and that homeowners will generally 
act (and in the political arena, vote) in a manner consistent with preserving 
the value of their homes.158  Hence Fischel’s invented term, homevoter, 
which reflects American homeowners’ tendency to vote on local matters 
with the value of their homes in mind.159  Aside from its importance to legal 
policy issues, the strong effect that homeownership has on local political 
behavior also reinforces the view that value is a significant component of 
156 FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 80-81 (“Nearly every study has shown that renters participate in local affairs in 
disproportionately low numbers compared to homeowners.  In a national survey, 77 percent of homeowners said 
that they voted in local elections during the period 1984-1992, while only 52 percent of the renters did.  Evidence 
from individual cities confirms the national data. . . . Asset ownership matters.”).  Beyond their political 
involvement, homeowners will also tend to make better neighbors because they are less likely to act 
opportunistically to the detriment of other members of the community because “the neighbor they might spite 
today is the neighbor they might need tomorrow.” Id. at 203.  The net effect of homeowner behavior, in the 
political arena and otherwise, is that having homeowners rather than renters as neighbors has raised home values 
in various cities. Id. at 46.
157
 As Fischel has noted,
The importance of a home for the typical owner can hardly be overstated.  Two-thirds of all 
homes are owner occupied.  For the great majority of these homeowners, the equity in their
home is the most important savings they have.  Data from 1990 surveys show that “median 
housing equity is more than 11 times as large as median liquid assets among all 
homeowners; even for homeowners over 65, that ratio was still more than 3 to 1.”
FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 4. Homes are not unique in being valuable, and many other types of property hold 
significant value, but the value of homes is profoundly important to homeowners.  Ownership and value are both 
components of many people’s psychological connection with their homes, Smith, supra note 7, at 36-37,  to the 
point where some people perceive a dwelling that is not owned as not-homelike. Id. at 42 (“A quarter of the 
respondents mentioned the lack of ownership, either physical or psychological, as indicative of a non-home.”). It 
therefore is not surprising that most Americans are focused, consciously or unconsciously, on preserving the value 
of their homes, or that their elected representatives act accordingly. See generally FISCHEL, supra note 1, passim 
(discussing political impact of homeownership).
158 Id. Homeowners behave differently than owners of other types of assets because homeowners have large 
portions of their wealth – for many Americans, more than half of their net worth – in their home.  As a result, 
homeowners cannot diversify the risk of loss to their homes as they can with other types of investments, and any 
loss has the potential to have a very significant impact on the homeowner’s financial position. Id. at 74-75.
159
 Fischel’s evidence does not lead to the dogmatic conclusion that homeownership should always be 
favored over renting, or that everyone should be encouraged to own a home.  Fischel himself notes that high 
homeownership rates may lead to higher unemployment rates because the lack of a rental market can interfere 
with the job market, and that homevoters acting in their narrow self interest of preserving their home values tend 
to support land use restrictions that lead to inefficient land use and suburban sprawl. See id. at 87, 232.  It is also 
worth keeping in mind the view of one commentator writing at the end of the Great Depression:
Much sentimentality has been developed around the idea of home ownership.  Civic virtue, 
the sanctity of the family, the spiritual influence of the old homestead, the lasting value of 
the family counsel held around the fireside, seem to be the exclusive privilege of the home 
owner.  Nothing is said by political orators, preachers, and crooners about the tragedy of 
mortgage foreclosures or overdue tax bills.
CAROL ARONOVICI, HOUSING THE MASSES 120-21 (1939).  More recent legal reforms such as fair lending laws 
and the right of redemption in foreclosure, see supra note 98 and accompanying text, have mitigated some of the 
concerns expressed by Aronovici, but our enthusiasm for home ownership should at least be tempered by the 
reminder that housing markets sometimes go down as well as up.
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people’s psychological relationship to their homes.160
The encouragement of political participation through property 
ownership has long been a significant strand in American republican 
thought,161 and homevoter republicanism is a strong theoretical justification 
for government policies that give preference to home ownership over home 
renting.  This said, the benefits of political participation and good 
citizenship do not alone justify policies that favor homeownership.  Rather, 
the benefits of homeownership must be balanced against the social costs of 
any given policy.
A focus on home ownership and citizenship is reflected in the favorable 
treatment given to homes in the Internal Revenue Code, most notably by the 
deduction allowed for interest on mortgages on homes and by the large 
exemption given to capital gains realized on the sale of homes.162  The 
favored treatment given to home ownership has been both widely criticized 
and widely defended on a number of grounds.163 One defense of the current 
160 See supra note 157 (discussing value and ownership in context of psychology of the home).
161 See Simon, supra note 123, at 1356-58 (discussing republican arguments that justify favoritism towards 
homeowners); see also supra notes 121 - 123 and accompanying text (discussing republican issues in the context 
of residential rent control).  At least since the emergence of a large urban underclass in industrial Nineteenth 
Century America, home has featured prominently in debates about poverty and social conflict.  Reformers and 
politicians in the late Nineteenth Century focused on the importance of a stable, safe home to the development of 
children and on the good citizenship that would result from home ownership by the poor.  Home ownership by the 
poor was also seen as a potential antidote for socialism, anarchism and social disorder, acting as a strong 
conservative influence by giving the poor a stake in society.  JAN COHN, THE PALACE OR THE POORHOUSE:  THE 
AMERICAN HOUSE AS A CULTURAL SYMBOL, 146-47, 214 (1979); see also PERIN, supra note 2, at 71-72 
(discussing social value of homeownership).  Cohn quotes remarks by President Hoover to the Conference on 
Home Building and Home Ownership that encapsulate the ideal of the home as a source of good citizenship:
Every one of you here is impelled by the high ideal and aspiration that each family may 
pass their days in the home which they own; that they may nurture it as theirs; that it may 
be their castle in all that exquisite sentiment which it surrounds with the sweetness of 
family life.  This aspiration penetrates the heart of our national well-being.  It makes for 
happier married life, it makes for better children, it makes for confidence and security, it 
makes for the courage to meet the battle of life, it makes for better citizenship.  There can 
be no fear for a democracy or for self-government or for liberty and freedom from home 
owners no matter how humble they may be. . . . Probably nothing creates greater stability in 
government than a wide distribution of property ownership on the part of the people 
interested in that government. . . . It is doubtful whether democracy is possible where 
tenants overwhelmingly outnumber home owners.  For democracy is not a privilege; it is a 
responsibility, and human nature rarely volunteers to shoulder responsibility, but has to be 
driven by the whip of necessity.  The need to protect and guard the home is the whip that 
has proved, beyond all others, efficacious in driving men to discharge the duties of self-
government.
COHN, supra, at 237-38 (quoting Home Ownership, Income and Types of Dwellings, Vol. IV of the Reports of the 
President’s Conference on Home Building and Home Ownership (1931)).  The desire to facilitate home ownership 
by the poor, however, ran headlong into America’s strong strain of individualism and aversion to devaluing the 
home as a symbol of honest labor and thrift by making it a subject of charity.  As a result, the American ideal 
“was that not every man deserved a home, but that every man deserved the opportunity to work for a home.” Id., 
at 146.
162 See I.R.C. § 163(h)(3) (mortgage interest deduction); I.R.C. § 121 (capital gains exclusion for principal 
residence).
163 See, e.g., Mark Andrew Snider, The Suburban Advantage:  Are the Tax Benefits of Homeownership 
Defensible?, 32 N. KY. L. REV. 157 (2005); Mann, supra note 155; Joseph W. Trefzger, Why Homeownership 
Deserves Special Tax Treatment, 26 REAL EST. L.J. 340 (1998); William T. Mathias, Curtailing the Economic 
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system is that it encourages homeownership, and therefore encourages good 
citizenship.164  Conversely, a criticism is that it unjustifiably subsidizes the 
housing costs of homeowners at the expense of home renters.165
Resolving the complex tax policy issues presented by the favored 
treatment of homeownership is beyond the scope of this Article.  The tax 
issue, however, is a good illustration of the potential significance of 
republican arguments for government policies that favor home ownership 
over home rental – encouraging active citizenship is a factor that supports 
favored treatment of ownership over rental, but is not one that should 
necessarily trump competing arguments.  It remains a testament of the 
importance of homeownership to voter behavior, however, that the despite 
the interest it creates in academia, serious political discussion of the 
abolition of the mortgage interest deduction remains a practical 
impossibility.
CONCLUSION
Charlotte Perkins Gilman observed that home “in its essential nature is 
pure good.”166 The positive characteristics of home, however, may be 
outweighed in specific circumstances by competing interests that also 
deserve legal protection. Each of the three Parts of this Article discussed
ideological conceptions of home and law that lend themselves to absolute 
application:  in Part I, home as castle; in Part II, Radin’s suggestion that the 
personal interest in the home should always trump competing fungible 
interests; and in Part III, the republican ideal that homeownership should 
always be encouraged.  The central conclusion of this Article is that while
each of these conceptions has strengths, legal issues involving in the home 
remain contextual and should not be resolved by blanket application of 
ideological principles.
In many circumstances – particularly those involving home as a source 
of individual autonomy and privacy – the unique nature of home often
justifies special legal treatment.  In others – such as homestead exemptions 
Distortions of the Mortgage Interest Deduction, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 43 (1996); Julia Patterson Forrester, 
Mortgaging the American Dream:  A Critical Evaluation of the Federal Government’s Promotion of Home Equity 
Financing, 69 Tul. L. Rev. 373, 406-409 (1994); Joseph Snoe, My Home, My Debt:  Remodeling the Home 
Mortgage Interest Deduction, 80 Ky. L. Rev. 431, 451-79 (1992). Because a large majority of Americans own 
their homes, eliminating the mortgage interest deduction entirely seems to be a political impossibility.  It may be 
politically possible, however, to make the mortgage interest deduction more progressive by reducing the cap on 
the amount of mortgage principal for which homeowners can take a deduction.  Reducing the cap from its current 
level of $1.1 million to, say, $400,000, would increase the tax burden on a small number of very wealthy 
homeowners while preserving a substantial benefit for all homeowners (including those with mortgages exceeding
the cap, who would still qualify for the exemption on interest from $400,000 of their mortgage).
164 See, e.g., Snider, supra note 163, at 176; Trefzger, supra note 163, at 346; Forrester, supra note 163, at 
407 & n.185.
165 See, e.g., Mathias, supra note 163, passim; Snoe, supra note 163, at 467-71.
166 GILMAN, supra note 11, at 8.
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and rent control – interests in the home are given too much protection.  In 
still others – notably equal division rules in family law and certain aspects 
of eminent domain law – the home is given insufficient protection. In all of 
these circumstances, striking the correct balance requires looking past the 
broad idea that homes are unique and special, and focusing instead on the 
particular aspects of home that are relevant to the issue at hand.
